From Satellites to Synthetic Biology: The Dual-Use Dilemma

In the ongoing Iran war, electronic interference, such as GPS spoofing or jamming, was reportedly used to disrupt signals and mislead navigation systems. This is seen as yet another example of how non-kinetic tactics that can disrupt communications and real-time intelligence collection have increasingly become part of modern warfare.

These tactics are not limited to space-based technologies, and extends to nuclear technology, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, etc. Notably, such technologies were developed to advance human well-being – for instance, satellite networks for disaster monitoring and cutting-edge biotechnology tools for vaccine production.

Yet many of these technologies can also be repurposed for military applications, like battlefield surveillance, or misused by malicious actors for cyber-attacks and weapons development. This dual potential renders them ‘dual-use’ technologies. The rapid advancement and diffusion of such technologies pose significant governance challenges, especially in balancing their beneficial use with the risks they entail.

Understanding dual-use technologies

Dual-use technologies refer to tools, materials or knowledge that have both commercial or civilian use and military applications. The term ‘dual-use’ was explicitly mentioned in a 1993 report, “Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction”, published by the United States Office of Technology Assessment.

Initially associated with nuclear technology, where the same materials can be used for energy generation and weapons development, the term now encompasses a wider range of emerging technologies.

Dual-use technologies refer to tools, materials or knowledge that have both commercial or civilian use and military applications.

Advancements in fields such as AI, additive manufacturing, biotechnology, cyber technologies, and advanced communication systems have altered the dual-use landscape. Technological development of these innovations is carried out within research institutions and private companies. But their growing accessibility, including digital diffusion, heightened the risk of their misuse.

Therefore, the primary challenge in dual-use technology governance lies in addressing the ‘dual-use dilemma’: promoting technological progress and innovation while preventing misuse and associated risks.

The original dual-use dilemma: Nuclear technology 

The most prominent example of dual-use technology is nuclear technology, where its materials and equipment (such as uranium enrichment and high-speed centrifuges), knowledge, and infrastructure can be used for both civilian energy production and nuclear weapons development.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is one of the major global frameworks aimed at:

1. Preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons.
2. Promoting cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy.
3. Advancing the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Verification and compliance are facilitated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) manages export control arrangements. The dual-use challenge, however, extends beyond the nuclear domain.

Commercial space in modern warfare

Commercial space technology is an example of how civilian innovations have gathered strategic significance. Satellite systems are necessary for supporting global communications, navigation, power grids, and emergency humanitarian services, but they are often used to aid military operations as well. The same systems can provide real-time intelligence and surveillance, and coordination capabilities for military operations.

As mentioned earlier, non-kinetic tactics that can disrupt communications and real-time intelligence collection have been used during recent conflicts, demonstrating that space-based technologies are increasingly being used as an instrument of modern warfare.

Similarly, the growing role of commercial satellite entities in warfare highlights how they are becoming embedded in geopolitics and international security. This has raised questions over the extent to which they provide information and services in contested regions – even under diplomatic pressure – and to what extent they will be held accountable for their actions.

The dual-use nature of commercial space technologies raises questions about how critical infrastructure for civilian and humanitarian purposes can be protected while preventing escalation of armed conflict into outer space.

These developments also raise legal and ethical questions, particularly regarding the blurring of traditional legal confines of armed conflict and what constitutes a lawful target.

There are several frameworks that apply to warfare in space, including the United Nations Outer Space Treaty, International Humanitarian Law, and the UN Charter. But recent conflicts highlight how the behaviour of state and non-state actors are evolving faster than existing laws. The dual-use nature of commercial space technologies raises questions about how critical infrastructure for civilian and humanitarian purposes can be protected while preventing escalation of armed conflict into outer space.

Biotechnology and biosecurity risks

Additionally, new governance concerns are emerging in the case of biological sciences. A key challenge lies in the potential use of materials, equipment, knowledge, and processes – originally intended for beneficial applications such as vaccine development, disease surveillance, and agricultural research – by malevolent actors to cause harm.

This ‘dual-use dilemma’ led to the formulation of various safeguards to increase awareness regarding the potential risks of dual-use research in biological sciences. While the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) remains the primary framework to curb the development and use of biological weapons, the risks of misuse and exploitation of these technologies have been aggravated by advances made in –

1. DNA synthesis technology.
2. Mirror biology.
3. The convergence of AI with biotechnology.
4. Increased democratisation of specialised knowledge through do-it-yourself (DIY) labs.

For instance, advances in nucleic acid synthesis enable researchers to order custom-made DNA sequences from companies for legitimate research activities such as the development of diagnostics or vaccines. However, the same technology could be misused to develop or modify pathogens with advanced features like the ability to evade immune surveillance.

To minimise these risks, some companies have begun screening DNA synthesis orders against databases of potentially dangerous organisms to ensure their use is legitimate and not intended to create harm. However, challenges in implementing these measures remain, including the ambiguity in defining ‘sequences of concern’, limitations in developing tools and infrastructure to support screening, and measures to facilitate compliance with screening.

The oversight landscape is further complicated by the convergence of AI with biotechnology. AI-biotech tools hold considerable promise in areas such as drug design, vaccine candidate prediction, and genomics. At the same time, there are concerns about the potential for deliberate misuse in developing bioweapons. Although safeguards to minimise risk are actively being deployed in these tools, the key challenge remains in balancing risk mitigation with the need to sustain scientific progress.

Why dual-use technologies are difficult to regulate

These emerging risks highlight challenges in the governance of dual-use technologies. There are at least two key characteristics of dual-use technologies that pose complex governance challenges: technological ambiguity and strategic value.

Technological ambiguity – Dual-use technologies often lack clear distinctions between civilian and military applications, making it difficult to distinguish between legitimate and potentially harmful uses. For instance, the Global Positioning System (GPS) was initially designed by the US Department of Defense for military purposes but was later adapted to improve safety and navigation in the commercial aviation sector.

Similarly, the infrastructure, tools, and materials used for legitimate purposes can be diverted for harmful ones. Although export controls for dual-use items seek to restrict the flow of materials, equipment, and software to limit the proliferation of illegal weapons of mass destruction (WMD), enforcement remains challenging.

Strategic value – Historically, scientific knowledge and technology have contributed greatly to military, political, and economic power, shaping national interests. Owing to their potential security implications, dual-use technologies have significant geopolitical value. Resultantly, states seek to ensure technological advantages, while limiting its access by adversaries. But uncertainty over the intent and capabilities of an adversary creates fear and can lead to arms race.

Governing dual-use dilemma

Various international treaties and export control arrangements are in place aimed at regulating the use, transfer, and proliferation of these technologies. These mechanisms span across multiple sectors and agencies, reflecting the different risks associated with each technological domain. Governance of dual-use technologies encompasses:

1. Preventing the development of dual-use technologies for malicious purposes.
2. Limiting access to tools, materials, and knowledge associated with these technologies.
3. Enabling their safe and secure handling and responsible use.

Moreover, key frameworks governing dual-use technologies are outlined in the table below:

Adapting governance for emerging technologies 

However, given the rapid advancement of emerging technologies, which continue to expand the scope of dual-use risks, the governance frameworks need to evolve accordingly. Existing frameworks remain central to global security, but they are increasingly challenged by rapid scientific innovation.

Strengthening governance mechanisms requires recognising the role of private companies in developing and operating dual-use technologies that are increasingly embedded in geopolitics and modern warfare. It also requires an expansion of oversight to address emerging risks at the intersection of AI and biotechnology.

Eventually, managing the use of these technologies not only rests on regulation but also on cultivating a responsible and ethical ecosystem that fully recognises the security implications of technological advancement.

This commentary originally appeared in The Indian Express.