A Maximalist Moment: Why Israel Isn’t Done with Iran

Following the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, experts are assessing the impact, particularly the damage to  Iran’s nuclear programme and the status of its ballistic missile stockpile. While these elements are critical to understanding future dynamics, they tend to overlook the fact that the ceasefire has de-escalated the conflict for now, but it has not stopped it.

For Israel, the attack that began on 13 June was not a final blow, but a calculated first strike in what promises to be a prolonged conflict. In Israel, some are advocating the “Hezbollah model”—continuing to strike despite a ceasefire. Though unacknowledged by either side, it is clear that Israel is still using what some have called the “free highway to Tehran”—an aerial corridor Israel planes use to fly over Iran— to maintain air superiority over the Islamic Republic.

The Israeli security leadership envision two main trajectories that the Israel-Iran conflict can take, after the unprecedented war the two countries waged against each other. The first ends with a tougher, more limiting nuclear agreement, with Iran agreeing to make concessions it previously rejected. One of those major concessions includes renouncing any form of domestic enrichment capabilities—a demand that Iran had long considered a non-starter prior to the war.

Although Iran may come back to the table of negotiations, the chances that it will agree to such a condition are low. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 12-day war, Iran has already repeated that it has no plans to stop enrichment. Israelis have sometimes invoked the “Libya model”, where  Muammar Gaddafi agreed to fully roll back his nuclear programme, at the height of the “War on Terror” and months after the US invasion of Iraq.

However, the Iranians’ takeaway from this model is that Gaddafi’s decision ultimately cost him his life. Perhaps having a bomb would have prevented foreign intervention that helped unseat the Libyan dictator,  and having a nuclear weapon represents the ultimate guarantee of regime survival. It is also true that Iran’s nuclear programme is what invited foreign aggression in the first place, as well as Iran’s power projection in the region.

Yet, some in Iran may argue that diplomacy, not the bomb, offers the best path forward. Since the 7 October attack, Israel has adopted a pre-emptive approach, even at the risk of prompting larger confrontations. There is no reason to think that this will be any different in Iran.

The second path is that of a protracted war between the two nations.  However, this time, Israel won’t be on the defensive, fending off attempts by Iran to surround it with increasingly potent proxies. With Iran poised to have a serious discussion on whether to dash towards a bomb, if that is at all possible, Israel simply cannot just step out of Iran’s airspace and wait to see who wins the internal debate that may shape Iran. It will feel compelled to monitor—and, if necessary, degrade—what remains of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

Although a regime change in Iran was not in the cards for Israel, Netanyahu has long advocated for a “comprehensive” policy against Iran, aiming to target all dimensions of Iranian power—its proxies, nuclear ambitions, missile programmes, and internal institutions. This maximalist camp has opposed any sort of “compartmentalised” deal that would seek to focus solely on one aspect. This is one of the reasons why Netanyahu has always been against the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Contrary to its name, the deal was viewed as not comprehensive enough, and allowed Iran to shift focus onto other areas.

The aftermath of 7 October, which saw the quasi defeat of Hezbollah, the fall of the Assad regime (one of the centerpiece of the “Axis of Resistance”), the destruction of Hamas as a cohesive military force, and has now led Israel to have air superiority over Iran, has vindicated the maximalist camp. This larger regional context is also testing the true end goals of this “maximalist camp”—a group not known for restraint when strategic opportunities emerge. What the current Israeli government may have planned isn’t a return to diplomacy, nor to put a pretty bow on the 12-day war. Rather, the war may well be the opening move in a more expansive effort, not just to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme, but to confront and possibly neutralise the Islamic Republic altogether.

Michael Horowitz specialises in geopolitical and security risk management with a focus on the Middle East and North Africa.