How Air Power will Reshape Geopolitics in the Gulf

Air power is reshaping Middle East geopolitics, with Gulf states relying on air defence systems while seeking diversification beyond Western suppliers. Competition for fifth-generation aircraft, strategic autonomy, and partnerships reflect alliances, though US security dominance remains central despite emerging alternatives.

Spotlight:

• The conflict in the Middle East over the past 40 days has been defined in large parts by air power, air defence, and targeted strikes. Supremacy in the air will, in large part, dictate the future of regional geopolitics
• Gulf states seeking new fifth-generation combat aircraft will mobilise their stated aims of diversification under the concept of strategic autonomy and multipolarity
• Non-Western defence suppliers are expected to find a newly formed strategic space in the Middle East’s lucrative defence bazaar

As the US- and Israel-led military campaign against Iran entered its second month, the Middle East remains on edge, with limited clarity from the administration of President Donald Trump regarding the trajectory of the conflict. This persists despite a round of failed direct talks between the US and Iran in Islamabad, Pakistan, and amid the most heightened regional tensions surrounding the prospect of a region-wide war in decades.

Air defence systems, originally designed for defensive postures, have emerged as the most critical assets for these countries.

Across the contested Strait of Hormuz, Gulf states continue to confront an almost daily barrage of drone and missile strikes launched by Iran. Air defence systems, originally designed for defensive postures, have emerged as the most critical assets for these countries. The US supplied MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, together with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system, has been at the forefront of intercepting low-cost missiles and drones deployed by Tehran as part of its strategy to transform a regional conflict into a global economic disruption.

At the other end of this conflict, defence partnerships, particularly in the domains of air defence and offence alike, may undergo significant restructuring, with Gulf states seeking to diversify their defence technology portfolios. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), for instance, has reported good returns from the South Korean-made Cheongung-II air defence system (often referred to as the ‘Korean Patriot’). With a reported 96 percent interception rate, the system has been highlighted as a major success, providing its manufacturer, Yongin-based LIG Nex1, with a boost in the international arms market. The Korean manufacturer has made substantial inroads into the Middle East’s defence sector, traditionally dominated by Western companies, by securing contracts with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

China has also sought entry into this emerging defence market. In the first week of April, reports suggested that Iran demanded an explanation “from two Gulf states” after claiming to have shot down a Chinese-made Wing Loong II drone over the city of Shiraz. The Chinese drone in question is effectively a derivative of the US-made MQ-9 ‘Reaper’ drone, developed by General Atomics and widely deployed during the war in Afghanistan. It has emerged as an option in the region for their armed forces to circumvent Western weapon systems, which often come with operational caveats tied to political understandings between states. By contrast, alternative defence technologies from newer countries are marketed as carrying fewer political constraints and less strategic baggage.

The diversification of platforms aligns with the broader aims of multipolarity and strategic autonomy pursued by many states.

The diversification of platforms aligns with the broader aims of multipolarity and strategic autonomy pursued by many states. To illustrate this argument further, the pursuit of fifth-generation fighter aircraft by Arab states has increasingly shifted away from American offerings, driven by geopolitical constraints and competitive manoeuvring. Israel’s insistence on remaining the sole operator of the F-35 stealth aircraft in the region has created a vacuum for Arab powers seeking comparable air capabilities. as Although, Saudi Arabia is expected to become the second customer of the F-35, the Israeli variant, nicknamed ‘Adir’ (‘the mighty one’ in Hebrew), is projected to retain a significant technological advantage.

Moving forward from the F-35, the strategic aims for such platforms have also evolved. Countries increasingly seek participation in these projects, often multinational in scope, not merely as buyers but as equity holders, thereby positioning themselves as semi‑producers of both platforms and technologies. . In this pursuit of technological one-upmanship, certain geopolitical relationships have shifted from fractures to cooperative frameworks. For example, both Saudi Arabia and Türkiye are often seen at odds over building their respective regional influence. However, Riyadh and Ankara have since found off-ramps along with an urgent need for defence collaboration to secure future requirements. Since 2025, Riyadh has been in talks at the “highest levels” to get the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) ‘Kaan’ fifth-generation combat aircraft. First unveiled in 2023, the Kaan prototype completed its maiden flight in 2024. Türkiye, over the recent years, has been at the forefront of aviation technologies, especially drones, as its Bayraktar line of unmanned aerial vehicles has gained increasing prominence across global conflict theatres. Indonesia has already become the first foreign customer for the Kaan, with other states also expressing interest.

In this pursuit of technological one-upmanship, certain geopolitical relationships have shifted from fractures to cooperative frameworks.

The UAE is another power seeking to expand its air fleet. Abu Dhabi has expressed interest in deepening its defence partnership with South Korea in this space as well, specifically by investing in the KAI KF-21 ‘Boramae’ fighter jet program. The UAE and South Korea in November 2025 signed a declaration of intent to establish a full-value chain partnership built around three critical tenets. The first is joint development, which would grant the UAE critical equity in a program capable of sustaining air superiority requirements for decades. Second, and equally significant, is the potential establishment of a local assembly unit in the Gulf. And lastly, the partnership envisions the co-export of the KF-21 to global customers.

Although South Korea still has a lot of work to do to join the ranks of the top arms providers club, successful battle-testing of systems such as the Cheongung-II will deliver its military industry a big boost as far as competitiveness is concerned. For Seoul, this is already being recognised in places such as Europe. The UAE in the ongoing conflict has been the most frequent target of Iranian missiles and drones with its air defences successfully neutralising over 96 percent of incoming projectiles. The South Korean case thus serves as a signal to emerging strategic partners, such as India, highlighting the importance of building depth through joint production and collaborative research and development of mutually required defence systems for the future.

The South Korean case thus serves as a signal to emerging strategic partners, such as India, highlighting the importance of building depth through joint production and collaborative research and development of mutually required defence systems for the future.

Finally, these defence-led reorientations may prove more difficult to implement following the Iran–US crisis and its impact on the Gulf states. The reality remains that the security systems built and provided by the US as of today remain unmatched despite their flaws. Many Gulf states may therefore need to reinforce their partnerships with Washington to sustain deterrence against Iran from here and could opt for the F-35 if the opportunity arises, potentially undermining efforts at indigenisation. Such dynamics may adversely affect planned diversification of strategic cooperation, particularly as demands under President Donald Trump, to reinvest in the US economy in exchange for security, are likely to persist. Nevertheless, alternatives do exist. Saudi Arabia has underscored its long-standing partnership with Pakistan, demonstrated by the deployment of Pakistani troops and fighter jets to the King Abdulaziz Air Base located in Dhahran, bordering Bahrain, under a strategic agreement between Riyadh and Islamabad signed in 2025. This arrangement suggests that extended air cover for nearby Bahrain, if need be, could be provided by the battle-tested Pakistani contingent. Other potential options, such as China, remain largely untested and cautious in terms of mobilising military assistance.

Diversifying kinetic risk within this framework will remain difficult for the Arab states in the near term. However, for the long term, the current crisis with Iran is likely to accelerate a sense of urgency around defence autonomy, indigenisation, and the multialignment of defence technologies.

These dynamics reinforce Washington’s position as the only reliable actor in the Middle East, regardless of preference. Diversifying kinetic risk within this framework will remain difficult for the Arab states in the near term. However, for the long term, the current crisis with Iran is likely to accelerate a sense of urgency around defence autonomy, indigenisation, and the multialignment of defence technologies.

Kabir Taneja is the Executive Director, ORF Middle East.