Spotlight 

  • A view has taken centre stage in the Gulf—that China will not militarily aid any partner directly.
  • Despite the Tehran–Beijing bonhomie, Iranian polity has at times also criticised China for not backing them fully.
  • Old US allies in the Middle East viewing Beijing as a strong enough power to cause concern within the US establishment is a victory for China at minimal cost and feeds into its push for a non-American global order.

The United States (US) midterm elections and the defeats delivered to President Donald Trump’s support base across red and blue states has, for the moment, paused the strategic trajectory of the US-Israel–Iran war. While military deployments in the Gulf escalate and low-key skirmishes in and around the Strait of Hormuz continue, a full-scale escalation seems distant. Yet, it is not improbable.

However, the Middle East remains in deep flux at a time when a large-scale shift away from the centrality of American power has begun. Hence, it is only natural that questions about the superpower-in-waiting are being asked continuously. What is China’s role in this geopolitically volatile international order, and is Beijing well placed to take advantage of it?

The Middle East conflict has shown that China remains non-committal as a security provider, let alone a guarantor, despite Gulf states using this situation to test Beijing’s intent and resolve. The crisis has also impacted China significantly, depleting its strategic oil reserves when its domestic economy’s bottom line is under duress. For the last few years, Beijing had benefited from purchasing cheap Iranian oil at hugely discounted rates, primarily to build its strategic oil reserves into the largest such infrastructure in the world. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2025, China added an estimated 1.1 million barrels of crude oil to its strategic inventory per day, taking the total to around 1.4 billion barrels as reserve.

In short, a view has taken centre stage in the Gulf—that China will not militarily aid any partner directly. This should not come as a surprise. China, for long, has criticised US interventionism and Western colonial architecture in the Gulf region. From as far back as Mao Zedong’s rule (1949–76), Beijing has seen the Middle East as a quagmire that keeps the US bogged down fiscally and militarily to China’s strategic benefit. There is no evidence currently available that this historical position is set to change. China’s core thinking remains grounded in a unipolar Asia: its wish to remain an uncontested power in the continent. While it has dispelled the notion of the US being a global hegemon, Beijing positions itself as a military power regionally but only as an economic power internationally.

However, this does not stop other nations from trying to use China as a hedge. Oman, one of the early mediators with Iran on the war, seemingly tried to protect its interests by doing so. Oman’s head of state, Sultan Haitham bin Tarik, conducted a state visit to China in November 2026, a first since 1978. This happened after Muscat’s mediation efforts during the Middle East conflict did not find favour in Washington, DC. In August 2026, Trump had threatened to bomb Oman, an American ally, if it got in the way of a deal with Tehran. Iran has since maintained a consistent outreach with Oman, a country whose northernmost border is the Musandam Peninsula, located in the now-contested Strait of Hormuz but separated from the Omani mainland by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The war in the Middle East was foremost in Sultan Tarik’s agenda.

The Gulf, Iran, and Israel have all witnessed China’s practical limitations over the past 10 months. This has led to frustration from some who might have been expecting Beijing to take clearer positions. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a noted UAE academic, when speaking at a conference in Abu Dhabi in November 2026, made no bones about a sense of disappointment, labelling China as an ‘unreliable’ partner that did not defend its vital interests in the region. The primary grievance driving this view is China’s inability, or unwillingness, to reign in Iran. As per some accounts, China has played a behind-the-scenes role in pushing Tehran to speak to the US. The ascent of certain mediators, such as Iran’s Speaker of the Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, is often credited to Beijing’s influence as China looks to mitigate a regional geopolitical spiral.

The China–Iran Relationship

The China–Iran relationship is both complicated and deeply ingrained. In March 2021, the two nations signed a 25-year comprehensive strategic programme with a wide-ranging mandate, including energy, investment, security, and infrastructure. For Beijing, good relations with Iran have multiple underlying reasons. First and foremost, there is oil. Iran’s vast reserves remain sanctioned but also underdeveloped and underexplored. This gives China a first-mover advantage, despite its own oil companies having high exposure to Western banks, markets, and financial institutions. China’s small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may take point here, as they did in Afghanistan in 2021, where their risk is entirely based on one or two business points abroad. Small and independent refiners in China have been nimble enough to take advantage of sanctioned Iranian oil for months. So, if big companies are unable to mobilise in these geopolitical spaces, smaller ones will grab the opportunity.

Despite the Tehran–Beijing bonhomie, the Iranian polity has at times also criticised their main partner for not backing them fully. “China has demonstrated that it can be a strategic partner to Iran, but not a strategic ally,” said Iranian academic Fariborz Arghavani. While there have been media reports that “Chinese groups” provided imagery and intelligence support in Tehran’s effective and accurate targeting of sites across the Gulf, the US position on Beijing’s role has been muddled by Washington itself. To put this in perspective, on the one hand, the US sanctioned Iranian oil, specifically targeting Chinese imports, while on the other, Trump refuted the idea that China (along with Russia) was helping Tehran, contradicting his own intelligence apparatus.

For China, the Middle East remains an important marketplace, where it does see the US being tied down as a strategic advantage for its own interests. For the Gulf, Iran, and Israel alike, as the second-biggest global economy, Beijing cannot be ignored and can be used as a strategic hedge, irrespective of China’s participation. Old US allies in the Middle East viewing Beijing as a strong enough power to cause concern within the US establishment is a victory for China at minimal cost and feeds into its push for a non-American global order.


Kabir Taneja is Executive Director, ORF Middle East.

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Author

Kabir Taneja

Kabir Taneja is the Executive Director of the Observer Research Foundation’s Middle East office. He previously focused on India’s relations with the Middle East (West Asia), examining domestic political dynamics, terrorism, non-state militant actors, and the region’s evolving security architecture. He is the author of books, book chapters, journal articles, and op-eds, and is a...

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