UAE’s evolving role as a key actor in the Middle East and beyond

In 2018, a year after the fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)  in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pledged US$50 million to fund heritage reconstruction in Mosul, which according to the Director-General of UNESCO, has been the largest cooperation to rebuild cultural heritage in the history of Iraq. A few years later, in 2021, the UAE announced that it would invest US$3 billion in aid as part of its larger post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In December 2023, UAE expressed its intention to reconstruct Gaza after the Israel-Hamas war, provided a US-backed two-state plan was brought to the table. More recently, on 4 June 2024, the Emirati leader held a formal meeting with the Taliban, indicating its desire to also contribute towards stabilisation and development in Afghanistan. From Mosul to Gaza and Kabul, Abu Dhabi’s strategic advances have caught much media attention. Security strategists label UAE’s humanitarian and international development efforts as part of the grand geopolitical ambitions of the once small state, a form of its “nation branding” in the international arena. Set against the backdrop of its humanitarian initiatives across different case settings, this article unpacks UAE’s evolving role as a key actor in the geopolitical landscape of the Gulf–and the world.

Rebuilding Mosul: Cultural cooperation or soft power diplomacy?

As part of the US$50 million cultural deal between the UAE and Iraq, the UAE in partnership with UNESCO, is rebuilding cultural heritage sites in Mosul, including Al-Nouri Mosque and its Al-Hadba Minaret, which were destroyed by ISIL. The reconstruction plan in Mosul also expanded to include the restoration of two church buildings destroyed during the ISIL’s occupation. The Al-Nouri mosque and its Al-Hadba minaret, a significant landmark of the city, are nearing its completion and are set to reopen towards the end of 2024. However, what remains unclear is why a middle power like the UAE would invest in cultural reconstruction in Iraq, especially given Iraq’s strained relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), one of the major regional organisations in the MENA region, since its invasion of Kuwait. 

One can look at the case of UAE’s humanitarian initiative in Mosul from the lens of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s engagement for heritage reconstruction in Bosnia after the Yugoslavian Civil War, which was perceived as a form of religious intervention to bring a form of Islam different from Bosniak Islam, and was heavily criticised. Although not labelled as a religious intervention yet, UAE’s involvement has been criticised for roping an Egyptian construction firm for the project rather than collaborating with a local firm. Further, the project has received backlash for its “Gulf-inspired” cubist redesign in the historic city, with locals slamming, ‘It’s not Mosul, it’s Sharjah’.

A survey conducted by the ‘After Islamic State’ project based at the University of Pennsylvania revealed that foreign-led heritage reconstruction in Mosul did not have much impact on the lives of people in Mosul. Heritage reconstruction is a relatively low priority for the people of Mosul and despite that various foreign states including the UAE are dedicating significant financial resources to rebuilding heritage sites across the city. Albeit such a reconstruction is not empowering the local communities, as depicted by public opinion, heritage reconstruction by the UAE in Iraq is a well-thought-out act of cultural diplomacy that helps brand its image on the global stage.

UAE’s energy infrastructure in Iraq: A humanitarian business model

Humanitarian development is UAE’s foreign policy in Iraq, evident from its announcement in 2021 to invest US$3 billion as part of its broader post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq. According to the joint statement by Abu Dhabi and Baghdad, “the initiative aims to strengthen economic and investment relations, create new opportunities for cooperation and partnership, and advance economic, social, and developmental growth in support of the brotherly Iraqi people.” Additionally, the same year, Abu Dhabi Ports Group signed a contract with the General Company for Ports of Iraq to explore investment prospects and improve cooperation in the maritime and transportation sectors.

The UAE has been focusing on infrastructure projects in Iraq to reinforce economic and energy ties. While Baghdad and Abu Dhabi signed multiple agreements to promote economic cooperation and investment in 2021, the UAE has also expressed interest in supporting Iraqi agriculture and tourism. This has been materialised with a UAE-based company called Acrotech being signed for its first agriculture investment deal with Iraq in 2022 to assist farmers in using the latest technology and modern science to increase production. Crafted strategically, foreign aid policy is UAE’s foreign policy in Iraq, which is “vigorously responsive to regional and global changes and challenges, aim[ed] at gaining international acknowledgement, leverage, recognition and relevance.”

Reconstruction in Gaza: Humanitarian cause or image building in the Gulf

As part of its larger ambition to establish long-term peace in the Middle East, and improve its ties with the West, the UAE normalised its diplomatic relations with Israel, signing The Abraham Accord in 2020. The Emirati political elites portray the Accord as a step forward to a more amicable Middle East, with the UAE at its heart. While the Accord was not primarily signed to facilitate a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine, it was cited as one of the objectives as part of the broader deal. In December 2023, almost three months into the Israel-Hamas War, the UAE proposed to contribute to Gaza’s reconstruction within the broader framework set by the US. It was foreseeable that the UAE conditioned its prospective rebuilding efforts in Gaza on a US-backed two-state solution, recognising the Palestinian state.

Reconstruction of Gaza is vital to contain the humanitarian crisis and is one of the integral elements for “long-term peace between Israel and Palestinians”. With a history of humanitarian diplomacy, and with formal diplomatic ties with Israel, the UAE is positioned as a viable reconstruction partner that could influence both Israel and the US. However, according to Lana Nusseibeh, the UAE Permanent Representative to the UN, without a US-backed road map to a two-state solution, “We’re not going to be as fully invested …That’s not the trajectory we signed the Abraham Accords on.” Further, the UAE has been at the frontline of global efforts in providing critical humanitarian aid to Gaza, leading the world with a substantial 27 percent contribution of the total aid sent to the enclave. While simultaneously preserving its image as a reliable partner for the US and Israel, UAE’s humanitarian aid to Gaza has not only helped it avoid Arab and domestic backlash but also ostensibly helped it build its image in the Arab world.

Engagement with the Taliban: A quest for regional influence

The recent meeting of the Emirati leader Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan with the representatives from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) in Abu Dhabi has fuelled much debate. However, the Taliban’s diplomatic foray into the UAE is not new or uncommon. For instance, since the Taliban’s takeover, Abu Dhabi has seen the situation in Afghanistan as an opportunity to bolster its reputation as a valuable partner to Western powers by showcasing its humanitarian credentials. This is well-reflected in Emirati assistance with the evacuation of foreign diplomats and around 28,000 Afghan people in 2020. In 2021, UAE’s funding to carry out humanitarian projects further underscores its humanitarian diplomacy in Afghanistan. In concurrence, Abu Dhabi has been steadfast in delivering food and other relief supplies to Afghanistan in 2022, a time when the country was battling severe poverty.

Furthermore, in May 2022, IEA signed a deal with a UAE-based firm, GAAC Solutions for the security and management of the airports in Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar. Later in December 2022, the IEA’s acting Defence Minister, Mullah Yaqoob, visited the UAE to discuss opportunities to bolster Abu Dhabi-Kabul relations further. Scholars like Giorgio Cafiero argue that by cautiously and pragmatically engaging the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), the UAE has advanced its own self-interest of becoming more of a flashpoint in competition between great powers in the region. For instance, Qatar has been successful in establishing itself as increasingly indispensable to the West vis-à-vis post-occupation Afghanistan—strengthening its role further amid the ongoing Israel-Hamas War. Given the geopolitical contest between Doha and Abu Dhabi, IEA’s presence in UAE is an opportunity for Abu Dhabi to oust its historic rival through humanitarian diplomacy. Thus, humanitarian aid has been an integral and strategically formulated component of the UAE’s foreign policy to serve its long-term economic interests in the MENA region and the rest of the world.

Conclusion

From funding the restoration of Mosul’s cultural heritage to pledging aid for Gaza’s reconstruction and engaging with Afghanistan under the Taliban, the UAE’s actions reflect a nuanced blend of humanitarianism and geopolitical strategy. These efforts underscore the UAE’s ambition to enhance its international stature and influence through soft power diplomacy, leveraging cultural and economic investments to build alliances and project a positive image on the global stage. The Mosul initiative, although criticised for lack of local involvement and a perceived imposition of Emirati aesthetics, exemplifies this approach by promoting cultural diplomacy. Similarly, the UAE’s substantial investments in Iraq’s infrastructure aim to foster economic growth and regional stability, potentially reshaping Iraq’s relations with the GCC. The Gaza reconstruction proposal, contingent on a US-backed two-state solution, further highlights the UAE’s strategic positioning as a mediator in Middle Eastern politics. Lastly, the UAE’s pragmatic engagement with the Taliban illustrates its intent to maintain regional influence and counter Qatar’s prominence. Collectively, these strategic actions depict the UAE’s calculated strategy to pursue its geopolitical interests and assert its presence in the MENA region—and the world.

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Sabine Ameer is a doctoral researcher in Politics and International Relations at the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom.