Reassessing Qatar’s Multi-Alignment Strategy

The mediator of the Middle East has been attacked. Twice. By two of its sworn enemies, Iran and Israel, in the past four months. Qatar, a country that has strived for diplomatic neutrality and prided itself on its ability to mediate challenging conversations, faced Iran’s attack on its United States (US) Al Udeid Air Base in June 2025. Israel also struck Hamas leaders in Doha in September 2025.

This multi-front aggression has not only impacted peace in Doha but has also laid bare the fractures in its foreign policy model. This necessitates the question of whether Qatar’s strategy of multi-alignment is an immunity or liability, especially in an age of escalating conflict and hardening alliances.

The Doctrine of Multi-Alignment

Multi-alignment represents a significant evolution from the more traditional concept of non-alignment. Born out of the Cold War, non-alignment was a defence strategy of equidistance. Its goal was to create security through insulation, preserving national sovereignty by refusing to actively align with the two great power blocs of the US or the erstwhile Soviet Union. In contrast, multi-alignment is not a strategy of defensive distance, but one of fostering close ties with multiple powers to strengthen negotiating positions. There is an increasing body of research on countries in the Global South employing this strategy. Certain analyses have characterised this approach as a form of ‘hedging’. For example, Singapore hedges by hosting US military assets at Changi and by maintaining its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) links with China. Security can be forged not through isolation but through utility. It requires a deliberate cultivation of deep relationships with all relevant actors to become an irreplaceable node in the global network.

Qatar’s statecraft in recent decades can be interpreted as an application of this doctrine. Its foreign policy could be understood as an architecture built upon distinct but interconnected pillars. The foundation of this structure was its security partnership with the US. By hosting Al Udeid Air Base, the largest American military installation in the region, Qatar secured an implicit guarantee for its territorial integrity from the world’s superpower. This security blanket did not constrain Qatar; rather emboldened it.

Qatar has hosted Hamas’ political office since 2012, stating that the US requested this as it wanted “to establish indirect lines of communication with Hamas”.

Building upon this security foundation, Qatar meticulously carved out its diplomatic niche as the region’s mediator. This was achieved by providing a platform for a range of non-state actors, most notably the political leadership of Hamas and the Afghan Taliban. Moreover, Qatar has hosted Hamas’ political office since 2012, stating that the US requested this as it wanted “to establish indirect lines of communication with Hamas”. It has also hosted the Taliban’s political office since 2013, facilitating talks that culminated in the 2020 Doha Agreement with the US. Hence, this relationship with controversial actors was not contradictory but complementary to its US alliance. Qatar offered a unique service that Washington found useful but could not provide for itself. This transformed Qatar’s status from a simple host for a US base into a uniquely valuable partner, granting it a level of diplomatic influence beyond its size.

These political and security manoeuvres were financed due to Qatar’s immense economic leverage as a global energy supplier. Its vast Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) wealth has constituted another critical layer of indispensability, making it a vital partner for the energy security of both Europe and Asia. This financial might has allowed it to project influence through strategic investments.

Finally, Qatar managed its most immediate geopolitical risk through the fourth pillar, a pragmatic engagement with Iran. Born out of the necessity to share the world’s largest gas field—South Pars/North Field—this policy of maintaining open channels with Tehran was critical to regional de-risking. Hence, Qatar systematically balanced its relations with Saudi Arabia, the US, and Iran to develop an assertive regional foreign policy.

Therefore, each alignment was not a standalone policy but a load-bearing pillar in a larger strategy to make Qatar too important to be overlooked. The pressing question is how a model that uplifted the country’s global profile ultimately turned it into a battlefield.

The attacks on Qatari soil have prompted a critical reassessment of the multi-alignment doctrine and an understanding of the latent risks within the strategy.

Risks of Multi-Alignment

The attacks on Qatari soil have prompted a critical reassessment of the multi-alignment doctrine and an understanding of the latent risks within the strategy. Rather than a singular failure, the events of the past months can be viewed as a stress test that reveals the inherent challenges of maintaining such a foreign policy in a volatile region.

First, there is likely a divergence in strategic cultures. Qatar’s statecraft is built on a network-centric logic of mutual interdependence. The recent events suggest this approach can be challenged when confronted with the security-first doctrines of other regional actors. For a government driven by a revolutionary ideology, such as Iran’s, or a state operating under a security-first doctrine like Israel, the calculation of risks is different. They prioritise retaliatory actions over preserving diplomatic networks, a scenario that Qatari strategy may not have been fully optimised to deter.

Second, the crisis has illuminated the crucial distinction between being a convenient hub and a truly indispensable actor. Qatar’s success in positioning itself as a vital centre for diplomacy and energy has endowed it with immense soft power and influence. However, the attacks suggest that the utility of a convenient partner can be outweighed when another state’s core security interests are perceived to be at stake. Furthermore, while Qatar’s mediation efforts have been critical, it has not been able to substantially qualify the claim that it brings unique value to the negotiating table that other actors cannot. In fact, Qatar’s close ties with Hamas are often criticised as a reason for its partiality.

Qatar’s success in positioning itself as a vital centre for diplomacy and energy has endowed it with immense soft power and influence.

Third, the strategy has had the unintended consequence of creating a high-profile stage for regional signalling. A key element of multi-alignment is raising a state’s global profile. Yet, this can make its territory a symbolic arena for other powers to communicate their intentions violently. The strikes can thus be interpreted not just as acts against Qatar itself, but as messages broadcast to a global audience, a warning for other states not to provide sanctuaries to groups such as Hamas.

Ultimately, the attacks have exposed an ambiguity in Qatar’s security trellis. The long-standing partnership with Washington has been the bedrock of Qatar’s defence. Nonetheless, the 9 September 2025 strike has raised profound questions about the scope and application of this security guarantee, particularly in this ally-on-ally conflict scenario. It suggests the security guarantees may have unspoken hierarchies and limitations, creating a new layer of uncertainty for Qatari policymakers.

The strikes of 2025 have laid out a crucial moment of truth. They have shattered Qatar’s sense of immunity, demanding a nuanced conversation about the future of its foreign policy. In the coming time, Qatari statecraft must not only respond responsibly to the current attacks but also establish deterrence against future ones. The debate is no longer about whether Qatar should amend its strategy, but how.

Samriddhi Vij is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation – Middle East.