Private Control of Connectivity in Modern Conflict

As digital infrastructure becomes central to warfare and crisis response, privately owned connectivity is reshaping sovereignty, accountability, and conflict governance

Digital infrastructure and communications form core components of modern conflict. Connectivity, cloud computing, satellite communications, and online platforms increasingly shape inter- and intra-regional conflicts, cross-border information flows, and grey-zone warfare. This infrastructure, however, is for the most part developed, owned, and operated not by states but by private technology companies with the capital and expertise to deploy digital infrastructure across borders at scale. In conflict and crisis settings from Ukraine to Iran, Venezuela, Sudan, and Myanmar, private companies have sustained communications and operations when state-controlled networks have failed or been deliberately shut down.

While use cases such as Starlink services being extended to Venezuela and Iran have been praised for preserving civilian access to information and documentation of abuse, the increasingly prevalent role of private technology companies in conflict scenarios has crucial policy implications. Since private technology firms operate across multiple jurisdictions and increasingly control access to digital infrastructure, their actions can lead to state dependency while simultaneously complicating regulation through the fragmentation of legal authority across states. Such private interventions are predominantly shaped by a mix of commercial incentives and operational security calculations, rendering their decision-making calculus quite different to those of states. States and civilian populations are thus bound to rely on privately-owned systems that cannot easily be substituted, regulated, or compelled to align with local standards.

This piece examines how private technology companies have come to exercise such influence in ongoing conflicts, the considerations that shape their ambitions in post-conflict environments, and the risks for both states and companies attempting to deploy such technologies.

Internet Connectivity as Decisive Power: The Emergence of Para-Sovereign Influence

Sovereignty has traditionally been defined by territorial control and a state’s control over critical infrastructure. Digital technologies have complicated this relationship as satellite internet, cloud providers, and global platforms allow services to be provided across borders without the need for large-scale physical infrastructure such as fibre-optic cables located in the receiving country. Starlink, for example, requires only an activated laptop-sized user terminal and line-of-sight to low-earth orbit satellites. This shift has transferred a degree of strategic power to private firms as gatekeepers of systems upon which states increasingly depend, but over which they retain limited regulatory control.

Private technology companies are reshaping modern conflict by controlling the digital infrastructure that states and citizens increasingly depend on during crises.

In Ukraine, private technology companies played a visible role following Russia’s 2022 invasion. Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite connectivity helped sustain communications when terrestrial networks were damaged or targeted. Laws that enforced centralised data storage in Ukraine were amended to allow service providers, including Amazon, Microsoft, Google and Cloudflare, to rapidly migrate data away from vulnerable physical data centres just months before they were targeted. Where dual-use has been a concern in conflict zones, such as in both Ukraine and Israel and Gaza, the navigation apps Waze and Google Maps platforms disabled live traffic data that could reveal military movements.

Satellite-based internet access has been used to circumvent blackouts that were either state-imposed in the case of Iran or, as it is now suggested, the result of US cyberattacks causing power outages in the case of Venezuela. In Iran, internet access has been essential for protestors as it enables communication with foreign governments and civil society, whose influence may yet prove decisive on domestic power contestation. However, the difference between the Iranian and Venezuelan contexts and Ukraine is that connectivity is not being provided to a sovereign state via an official government contract. Rather, it has been provided for free — at least in initial stages of conflict or crisis scenarios — to civilians through informal and unregulated channels in Ukraine, Iran, and Venezuela. In many cases, such interventions can be understood as morally justified, particularly where connectivity preserves civilian access to information during domestic or international conflicts — Iran being a prime example. Nonetheless, the distinction demonstrates how private actors can introduce or withdraw critical connectivity in ways that bypass state authority, reshaping sovereignty not through territorial control but through infrastructural dependency.

Why Companies Intervene: Morality, Market Access, and Strategic Incentives

According to the Atlantic Council’s analysis of tech decision-making in Ukraine in the war’s early stages, moral clarity on the conflict clearly played a role in motivating corporate responses in Ukraine. However, moral considerations operate alongside other, more pragmatic factors such as reputational dynamics. Public recognition from governments and civilians can reinforce a company’s image as a responsible global actor. Against the backdrop of Musk’s increasingly polarising domestic political profile in the US, his extension of Starlink connectivity to Iranians and Venezuelans amid regime-imposed internet blackouts has arguably contributed to a partial reframing of his public image as a provider of critical humanitarian infrastructure.

Commercial and strategic incentives are equally relevant. Conflict environments provide extreme conditions in which technologies can be stress-tested and refined. Satellite networks operating under jamming and spoofing attempts, such as those Starlink has been facing since announcing the extension of services in Iran, or cloud services defending against sophisticated cyberattacks, generate operational insights that are difficult to replicate in peacetime. Successfully operating in these environments can strengthen a company’s reputation for resilience and trustworthiness, reinforcing brand credibility. Executives such as Microsoft’s Brad Smith have noted that experience gained in Ukraine improved their ability to protect customers globally and increased confidence among government clients when making purchasing decisions.

Beyond the experience gained via service provision in immediate conflicts, companies also consider longer-term market potential. Countries such as Iran and Venezuela combine large populations, significant energy resources for data centres, and strategic geography relevant to global connectivity corridors. Some groundwork for cross-regional digital connectivity is already in place: Iran is a landing point in the OMRAN cable — part of the Europe-Persia Express Gateway (EPEG) — as well as a central node of the proposed “Iran Corridor”, which seeks digital connectivity expansion along the established International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) route. Venezuela is connected to the US, wider Caribbean, and Latin American regions through the ARCOS-1 submarine cable network. Though current sanctions limit formal engagement, a potential “day-after” scenario involving regime change or normalisation could present opportunities for these cable networks and foreign technology firms to expand further into these markets. However, damage to existing digital infrastructure sustained by conflict may require substantial capital to rebuild, alongside heightened security planning to protect new investments in often unstable transitional settings. As such, this is likely to be a consideration primarily for firms requiring limited physical infrastructure or technology giants with sufficient capital, such as SpaceX, Amazon, Microsoft, and Google.

Risks, Constraints, and the Accountability Gap

While the involvement of private technology companies can enhance resilience and access, it also introduces a set of risks that remain under-governed. One of the most persistent challenges is dual use, since technologies designed for civilian internet connectivity or information sharing can be repurposed by repressive forces or occupying powers — as was found to be the case with traffic alerts being used to track troop movements. Additionally, when private infrastructure becomes integral to military or quasi-military operations, it may be treated as a legitimate target.

Though experiencing jamming, spoofing, and cyber interference against commercial systems can, as previously mentioned, contribute to service improvements, it also puts these companies under intense risk. Considering that some companies involved in providing services in conflict zones hold sensitive government and civilian data — most prominently Starlink, which is deeply embedded in NASA and US Department of Defense contracts — the convergence of civilian, commercial and military functions raises the risk that vulnerabilities in one domain may have cascading consequences in others, for example if malware is able to spread laterally across connected systems.

Ownership of satellite connectivity has transferred strategic power from states to private actors, complicating sovereignty and post-crisis governance of technological infrastructure.

In addition, the public falling-out between the large and often unpredictable personalities of Musk and President Trump introduces the possibility that privately controlled infrastructure could be slowed or withheld at the will of private sector executives, underscoring a broader structural risk for states that depend on a narrow set of technology providers for critical government functions.

These risks are compounded by the fact that states often lack clear jurisdictional authority over systems that are embedded in conflict zone operations, but are legally and technically distributed across multiple countries. The challenge of bringing such infrastructure under effective national control, or making it “sovereign” — a concept still being worked out, is amplified by the market concentration of advanced technologies. As a result of the high capital requirements and technical barriers limiting competition in sectors such as satellite internet, it is unlikely that actors beyond the small number of firms currently operating in this sector will enter the market at scale in the near term, entrenching service provision within a narrow group of providers. As such, these few become systemically important, with limited alternatives available to states or populations affected by their decisions.

Conclusion

The private tech sector must increasingly be watched as a predictor of outcomes in global geopolitical events, since ownership of extraterrestrial infrastructure, in particular, gives private actors the capacity to bypass sovereign leaders. Private technology companies play a consequential role in conflict environments by controlling digital infrastructure that shapes civilian communications to the wider world, information flows, and operational resilience within armies and opposition groups. Their influence stems less from formal authority than from ownership of systems that states and citizens increasingly depend on during crises, often without viable alternatives or effective regulatory oversight.

For private technology companies, engagement in conflict-affected or crisis environments requires weighing the costs and risks of establishing operations, particularly where services depend on physical infrastructure. Damage to networks and insecure operating conditions increases the risk that technologies may be repurposed for dual use or co-opted by unintended actors, exposing civilian and government data should systems fail or be compromised, while also harming a company’s reputation.

Policymakers should recognise that where private engagement is desirable, governments can lower barriers through anti-corruption measures, clear public–private coordination mechanisms, and improvements to the security environment. At the same time, states must acknowledge that control over critical digital infrastructure is increasingly concentrated in private hands, limiting their ability to direct connectivity during political transition.

Elizabeth Heyes is a Junior Fellow – Technology and Innovation Policy at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) Middle East.