The Weaponisation of Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz Chokepoints

The following excerpt is from Chapter 2 — Hormuz: Breaking the Insecurity Continuum

For decades, freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb has been considered a global public good, protected through international law—particularly the principle of unimpeded transit passage under Article 38 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)a—and external military deterrence. While periodically challenged,b this governance framework had proved remarkably resilient until recent crises fundamentally altered the status quo.

Today, the two chokepoints form part of an integrated system of insecurity in which regional conflicts of the Middle East and the Horn of Africa intersect and amplify one another. The weaponisation of the Bab el-Mandeb by the Houthis,c beginning in 2023, and of Hormuz by Iran, in 2026, occurred in the context of highstake regional wars, allowing relatively weak state and non-state actors to turn these geographic bottlenecks into strategic amplifiers. The regional and global economic disruptions caused by the blockade of trade routes transformed local conflicts into major geopolitical events. Furthermore, the crisis has exposed profound gaps in the governance of both straits, which are difficult to bridge and are likely to have repercussions that will outlast the ongoing wars.

Much attention has been directed to the maritime dimension of the Hormuz–Bab el Mandeb conundrum. However, since the principal drivers of this maritime instability are terrestrial— rooted in political fragmentation, contested authority, proxy conflicts, and geopolitical competition on land—naval operations to secure individual waterway alone cannot ensure effective and sustainable solutions. Governing the two chokepoints requires moving beyond predominantly military and sea-centric approaches towards a multilayered regional governance framework.

From Connected Chokepoints to an Integrated System of Insecurity

The Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb increasingly function as a single strategic system in which the maritime, political, economic, and security dynamics of the Middle East and Horn of Africa are deeply intertwined. This system is shaped by, and in turn impacts, both the horizontal and vertical dynamics that influence the wider region. Horizontally, expanding regional trade and investment have deepened interdependence between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, while simultaneously fostering geopolitical rivalry and militarisation, thus increasing instability. Vertically, both chokepoints are embedded in global energy and logistics networks, which structurally links regional conflicts and ensuing disruptions to international trade and the world economy. Consequently, local security dynamics are increasingly tethered to broader great power rivalries and Middle Eastern geopolitical competition.

This increasingly intertwined system stretching from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf has impacted maritime security across both waterways, as illustrated by the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and by the Hormuz crisis. Moreover, it provides opportunities for deeper tactical cooperation between armed groups across the western Indo- Pacific, as evidenced by reports of operational links between the Houthis and Somalia’s al- Shabaab.^[1]

Within this framework, the strategic significance of maritime chokepoints is evolving. Their value increasingly lies not only in the high volume of trade they carry but also in their capacity to amplify local conflicts and translate local disruptions into global economic and geopolitical shocks.

Unlike the piracy of the 2010s, which targeted vessels primarily for economic gain, recent attacks on commercial shipping in Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb have aimed at advancing broader strategic objectives. State and non-state actors alike leverage these attacks for political signalling and coercion. Furthermore, the threshold for disruption is remarkably low as a single missile or drone strike against a commercial vessel may be sufficient to raise insurance premiums, force shipping companies to adopt costly rerouting, and disrupt global logistics. Given the favourable costbenefit ratio and the relative ease of execution of such tactics, their future proliferation among other state and non-state actors remains a distinct possibility.

International law no longer controls states’ behaviour in this new geopolitical landscape. Instead, it is increasingly used to justify actions, shape narratives, and influence third parties.^[2] This evolution is likely to reshape the governance of strategic waterways in the Middle East and beyond.

The Limits of Fragmented, Military, and Sea-Centric Responses

In recent years, maritime security in the Bab el- Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz has become a shared priority for multiple global actors. However, international response has remained fragmented and heavily reliant on ineffective military approaches.^[3]

Across the wider Bab el Mandeb-Gulf of Aden space, external and regional powers have expanded their naval and logistical presence, reinforcing their military postures to secure critical shipping routes. While the US has traditionally acted as the primary guarantor of maritime security in these waters, it has increasingly sought to shift the burden to regional and extra-regional partners. This trend has been further reinforced under the Trump administration which no longer views regional maritime security as a strategic priority.^[4] However, an alternative regional or international mechanism to coordinate maritime security is yet to emerge. Moreover, no inclusive framework has been established to promote collective responsibility for safeguarding freedom of navigation. This lack of cooperative response stems from prevailing geopolitical rivalries and diverging strategic priorities, which have reinforced competitive approaches and stymied collaboration efforts.

Moreover, the principal drivers of maritime insecurity in Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb are not maritime in origin. While naval operations are necessary for managing immediate threats, they are insufficient for restoring durable confidence in maritime routes or addressing the underlying drivers of insecurity. Recent operations against Houthi threats in the Red Sea illustrate the limitations of military approaches.^[5]

The situation in the Strait of Hormuz is even more emblematic. Iran’s blockade of maritime traffic during its conflict with the US and Israel has proved to be an immensely effective instrument of asymmetric warfare, allowing Tehran to exert pressure on the US, the countries of the region, and the broader international community alike.^[6] It is likely that Iran will continue to deploy this tactic, or threaten to do so, in the future.

This leverage serves as the foundation for Iran’s current negotiating posture, aimed at establishing a binational system of governing the Strait with neighbouring Oman. This mechanism would grant Iran full control over transiting vessels as well as generate revenue through service fees mechanisms^[7]—a de facto termination of the unimpeded transit passage regime that existed before the war. Despite fierce US opposition to such an arrangement, geographic reality makes any military operation aimed at forcing Iran to relinquish its control over Hormuz both operationally challenging and financially unpalatable.

Ultimately, the limitations of maritime operations are more structural than operational. They are costly, politically difficult to sustain,d and require complex coalitions. More fundamentally, they address symptoms rather than causes. The challenge, therefore, is to develop governance arrangements capable of addressing the political and institutional drivers of insecurity across the wider Red Sea–Hormuz arena.

From Maritime Security to Regional Governance

The Strait of Malacca provides one of the most developed examples of functional maritime cooperation among littoral states managing a high-traffic strategic chokepoint. Regional cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand has progressively reduced maritime insecurity in the Strait while fully preserving national sovereignty. Through the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) and associated surveillance and intelligence-sharing mechanisms, these states have maintained effective operational coordination against piracy and maritime crimes^[8] – demonstrating how incremental cooperation among coastal states can yield collective security outcomes.

In contrast, broader strategic complexity and geopolitical fragmentation in the Red Sea–Hormuz region make sustained regional coordination and comprehensive regional frameworks significantly harder to establish. Cooperation in this theatre is therefore more likely to emerge through narrow, functional arrangements addressing specific operational needs.

A first step in this direction was taken on 31 July 2026, with Saudi Arabia hosting the first meeting of a new Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance—supported by 14 countries and aimed at protecting global trade routes in the Red Sea.^[9] Riyadh framed the initiative as a step towards establishing a collective security architecture to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Red Sea while also building a broader regional stability framework.

The proposed Alliance signals that regional states are increasingly cognisant of the need to prioritise the land-sea security nexus. However, there is a risk of the project remaining a nonstarter, much like the Red Sea Council launched by Saudi Arabia in 2020. Given the low level of geopolitical trust among key stakeholders, maritime governance in the region is more likely to evolve incrementally through functional cooperation in less sensitive areas of soft security.

Potential Multilateral Frameworks in the Hormuz-Red Sea Arena

In the Hormuz-Red Sea arena, regional and international actors must pursue a gradual strategy built on aligned interests and mutual economic opportunities. Over time, these functional entry points may generate sufficient trust to sustain more structured regional cooperation. While multilateral frameworks alone cannot resolve the structural fragmentation of the region, comparative experience suggests they can help preserve channels of dialogue and stabilise expectations during crises.

For the Red Sea, this process can be initiated through initiatives operating across three mutually reinforcing levels.

First, immediate operational cooperation should centre on practical maritime security functions, where the interests of all stakeholders partially converge. This includes reinforcing coast guard capabilities in the Horn of Africa, fostering coordination and information sharing, strengthening maritime domain awareness, and improving maritime interoperability between deployed naval forces and port and shipping security systems. These measures can establish baseline predictability without requiring major political alignment.

Second, trade, port governance, and maritime logistics across the region should be seen as instruments of security governance. Improvements in port efficiency, connectivity, customs procedures and regulatory harmonisation can progressively transform limited cooperation into durable interdependence. Furthermore, the blue economy offers an additional pathway for reinforcing economic interdependence and maritime stability.^[10]

Third, regional dialogue mechanisms must provide a structured platform for sustained communication on the perceptions, priorities, and concerns of various stakeholders. This can help de-escalate tensions, minimise misperceptions, and identify limited areas of cooperation.

A long-term solution to the Hormuz problem must be anchored in multilateralism and widely accepted legal principles. While the current bilateral framework under discussion between Iran and Oman can be seen as a preliminary step, negotiations must be rapidly broadened and made more inclusive to protect the interests of all stakeholders. The only way to stop Iran from pursuing unilateral securitisation of the Strait is to shift its strategic calculus. This can be achieved through an inclusive multilateral governance mechanism that builds on shared interests, introduces positive interdependence among stakeholders, provides incentives for participation, and raises the cost of exclusion for Iran.

Conclusion

The strategic challenge posed by the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb lies not simply in their exposure to disruption, but in the fundamental mismatch between an integrated system of insecurity and the fragmented systems of governance. These chokepoints are increasingly interconnected at both strategic and operational levels, yet international responses remain geographically compartmentalised and predominantly centred on military instruments. Similarly, despite the maritime instability stemming primarily from political fragmentation, contested authority, and proxy competition on land, it continues to be managed through naval deterrence at sea. This persistent misalignment between causes and instruments limits the effectiveness of current approaches and fuels recurrent cycles of disruption.

Addressing this challenge requires moving towards an inclusive, multilayered regional governance architecture that combines maritime cooperation, economic confidence-building through trade and connectivity, and structured political dialogue mechanisms. The governance of maritime chokepoints cannot be separated from the political, legal and security orders that surround them.

Such arrangements are unlikely to lead to the emergence of a single institution. Instead, governance will remain layered, combining sovereignty, international law, and security cooperation. Where insecurity is integrated, governance must become integrated as well.

Virginie Collombier is Co-founder and President of the Mediterranean Platform.

Luigi Narbone is Co-founder and Vice-President of the Mediterranean Platform and former EU Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries.

The authors acknowledge the use of ChatGPT for English-language editing prior to submission.

Endnotes

^[1] Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Expanding al- Shabaab–Houthi Ties Escalate Security Threats to the Red Sea Region,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, May 28, 2025; Ibrahim Jalal and Adnan al-Jabarni,” Dhows, Drones, and Dollars: Ansar Allah’s Expansion into Somalia,” Carnegie Middle East Center, March 14, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/04/ dhows-drones-and-dollars-ansar-allahs-expansion-intosomalia; Sammar Khader, “A Pact Between al-Shabab and the Houthis Threatens Red Sea Shipping,” New Lines Magazine, July 1, 2025, https://newlinesmag.com/ spotlight/a-pact-between-al-shabab-and-the-houthisthreatens- red-sea-shipping/.

^[2] Ferid Belhaj, “The Hormuz Test: Power, Law and the Fragmentation of Trade and Connectivity. A triple fracture,” in Hormuz and the Invisible Fractures: The Price of a Distant War (Rabat: Policy Center for the New South, June 2026), https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/ hormuz-and-invisible-fractures-price-distant-war-viewsnew- south

^[3] Luigi Narbone & Cyril Widdershoven, The Red Sea Link: Geo-Economic Projections, Shifting Alliances, and the Threats to Maritime Trade Flows, Florence, European University Institute, 2021, https://cadmus.eui.eu/entities/ publication/57edc596-ca1f-539f-ba28-7f0ecaf6bd14.

^[4] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, November 2025, Washington DC, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025- National-Security-Strategy.pdf.

^[5] Council of the European Union, “Security and Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea: Council Launches EUNAVFOR ASPIDES,” Council of the European Union, February 19, 2024, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ press/press-releases/2024/02/19/security-and-freedomof- navigation-in-the-red-sea-council-launches-new-eudefensive- operation/.

^[6] Gawdat Bahgat, “Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz: What Lies Ahead?” Middle East Policy 33, no. 2 (June 2026); Emily Tasinato, “Hormuz: La fine dello Status quo ante,” Commento No. 36, Fondazione CFS, 26 May 2026, https://www.fondazionecsf.it/it/attivita/ricerca/commenti/ hormuz-la-fine-dello-status-quo-ante.

^[7] Parisa Hafezi and Timour Azhari, “Proposed Hormuz Deal Would Give Iran Control Inbound Traffic, Sources Say,” Reuters, August 5, 2026,https://www.reuters.com/ world/middle-east/us-iran-having-very-good-discussionstrump- says-2026-08-05/.

^[8] Omar Al- Ubaydli et al., Maritime Security in the MENA Region: Lessons from the Malacca Straits Patrol, Note 5, July 2025, The MENA2050 Regional Vision Team,https:// drive.google.com/file/d/10KLXEKfb7KUV6yN5FQj4ylyI mM6gSw6X/view.

^[9] Ammar Awad, “Saudi Arabia’s Maritime Alliance Could Reshape Red Sea Security,” Al Arabiya English, July 31, 2026, https://english.alarabiya.net/views/2026/07/31/ saudi-arabia-s-maritime-alliance-could-reshape-red-seasecurity-.

^[10] Mehari Taddele Maru et al., “Conclusions. Pathways from Competition to Cooperation” in The Red Sea: Divided by Waters, United by Opportunities, (Middle East Council on Global Affairs, Mediterranean Platform, Pan African Agenda eBook, February 2026),https://mediplatform. org/blog/the-red-sea-divided-by-water-united-byopportunities/