The following excerpt is from Chapter 8 — Hormuz: Breaking the Insecurity Continuum


The closure of the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 has been unanimously described as a crisis of the Gulf, with the conflict between the United States (US) and Iran at its centre. Viewed through this lens, the primary actors are Iran and the states assembling to reopen the passage, the vessels that matter are the tankers bound for Asia and Europe, and the geography ends at the Gulf of Oman.

The impact of the closure, however, goes beyond. It has travelled down the Red Sea corridor to the Horn of Africa, a region whose exposure to disruption in these waterways is far-reaching but whose role in the response has been disproportionately limited.[1] The line connecting Hormuz to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait runs directly through the waters on which Somali, Djiboutian, Eritrean and other Horn residents livelihoods depend. Yet, those most exposed to this new reality have had almost no say in its governance. The gap between exposure and influence is the starting point of this article.

A Linked Crisis and Its Costs

The case for treating the Horn of Africa as a stakeholder in the Hormuz crisis begins with a geographic fact that the dominant framing tends to ignore: the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb are not two separate challenges but a single, interlinked system of vulnerability.

Map of Arabian Peninsula maritime chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017.[2]

The connection is one of shared risk more than shared cargo. While most of the oil leaving Hormuz sails east to Asia, not through the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb still carries much of the containerised trade between Asia and Europe and remains central to Saudi Arabia’s overland bypass to Yanbu. The disruption at any one strait reroutes ships, lifts insurance, and reprices trade at the other.[3]

Furthermore, the two straits are also operationally tied. The Houthis have linked their disruption of the Red Sea directly to the escalatory dynamics at Hormuz. In July 2026, they declared a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia and struck Saudi tankers, reactivating the southern chokepoint even as talks mediated by Oman, Pakistan, and Qatar circle the terms of passage at the northern one.[4] These vulnerabilities, however, predate the ongoing conflicts, which have simply collapsed the timeline within which they might still have been managed, dragging the Horn of Africa directly into the centre of the crisis.

For the states of the Horn, the consequences are immediate and material rather than strategic and distant. Somalia imports well over 90 percent of its essential commodities by sea, including all of its refined fuel and more than half of its cereals. Within days of the strikes, fuel prices in Mogadishu more than doubled,[5] triggering a cascade that disrupted electricity, hospitals and transport, sparking widespread protests.[6] Similarly, approximately one-third of the fertiliser supplying Sub-Saharan African agriculture normally transits the Strait. The route’s disruption has endangered the upcoming planting season in Horn nations such as Somalia, where 6.5 million people already face severe hunger and the risk of impending famine remains high.[7]

The Gulf contraction has also affected remittances worth US$2 billion a year, nearly a quarter of Somalia’s gross domestic product (GDP),[8] while livestock and meat exports were stranded during the critical Eid season.[9] For Horn economies with thin fiscal buffers, the cascade from freight cost to food price is an existential threat. Ethiopia, landlocked and reliant on the same corridor, has seen fuel shipments stranded in the Gulf. Between February and June 2026, urea prices rose from around US$450 to over US$700 per tonne. The crisis even affected voter registration for the June 2026 elections, as fuel shortages left vital electoral equipment stranded.[10]

The security consequences compound the economic ones. The corridor that carries the Horn’s trade also facilitates illicit flows between the Horn and Yemen,[11] which is only reinforced by a militarised, contested southern Red Sea. Berbera, Somaliland’s port and economic lifeline, sits just 260 km from Houthi-controlled territory and has been named a potential target. This risk is sharpened by external moves along the same coastline: the UAE already operates the port and an airstrip, and reported plans for an Israeli foothold risk pulling contested Somali territory into confrontation.[12] Already, the Houthi entry into the war has turned the southern Red Sea from a secondary front into one of the conflict’s main external arenas, drawing in Saudi Arabia, Israel, the UAE, Egypt, and Turkey. Meanwhile, with international attention diverted, al-Shabaab is regrouping in the resulting vacuum, and there is a resurgence in piracy.[13] While the Houthi campaign predates the 2026 war, and the Horn’s dependence on these lanes is older still, the closure of Hormuz has raised the stakes for every state along the connecting waterway.

From Host to Partner

The deepest damage, however, may be political rather than physical—a dimension rarely captured in current maritime security debates. The war has severed what little international attention the Horn still received, accelerating a gradual disengagement into abandonment.[14] In Somalia, humanitarian funding has plummeted: the US has cancelled its contribution to the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), wiping out a quarter of the total budget and deepening a Western retreat that was already underway before the Gulf crisis consumed the region’s remaining diplomatic bandwidth. Sudan risks losing vital ceasefire pressure as external interlocutors look elsewhere. Furthermore, the sudden lack of international attention is driving regional instability as local actors capitalise on the vacuum to make aggressive moves over ports, political recognition, and contested transitions.

This realignment has reduced the Horn to an object rather than an actor, even as states such as Eritrea and an Ethiopia desperate for sea access refuse to remain wholly passive. Egypt and Eritrea have signed a maritime cooperation pact arguing that the Red Sea should be governed by its littoral states, not by landlocked neighbours such as Ethiopia or by arrangements dictated by outsiders.[15] With Washington warming to Asmara, external powers—among them the Gulf states, Egypt, Turkey, and Israel—are scrambling to position themselves through shifting, overlapping alignments rather than fixed blocs. The cumulative effect is a securitisation of the entire coastline, with the Horn valued mainly as a logistical base and observation zone for a crisis centred elsewhere.[16]

Despite being indispensable to the international response, the Horn is not an architect of this response. Djibouti alone hosts the military forces of the US, China, France, and Japan, among others, in closer proximity than anywhere else in the world. The naval missions patrolling the corridor—from the European Union’s Operation Aspides, which spans from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to the Strait of Hormuz, to the new France-UK-led effort backed by European navies and hosted logistically by Oman—are designed in Brussels, Paris, London, and Washington.[17] Executed from or alongside Horn territory, these arrangements leave the region supplying the geography and absorbing the risks, with no part in the decision-making. With access, ports, and recognition now the currency of strategic positioning, a Horn that does not learn to trade on its own terms will find the terms decided for it.

What the Horn Can Contribute

If the Horn is to move from host to partner, the conversation must go beyond the naval dimension that has thus far dominated it. While warships matter, they are the contribution the Horn is least able to make and one that external powers already provide in abundance.

The Horn’s distinctive strengths lie elsewhere. The first is geography, expressed through ports and inland corridors: from Berbera and Djibouti to Bosaso, Mogadishu and the Eritrean coast. These are the nodes over which the current scramble for access is being fought and on which any strategy of resilience will depend. The second is legal and diplomatic, and it is currently the most overlooked. The states of the Horn are coastal states under international maritime law, possessing rights over vast exclusive economic zones. Somalia’s delimitation of its maritime boundary with Kenya at the International Court of Justice shows the region can assert those rights instead of simply absorbing the decisions of other states.[18] Furthermore, frameworks of regional governance already exist: the African Union’s 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy, the 2016 Lomé Charter, and the Djibouti Code of Conduct with its 2017 Jeddah Amendment already provide the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden states African-owned frameworks against piracy, trafficking, and illegal fishing.[19] The gap, however, lies in the enforcement of this architecture, which is where regional effort should concentrate.

Much of what actually secures a waterway is not blue-water naval power but the everyday work of coastal states—namely, maritime domain awareness, the sharing of tracking data, coastguard patrolling, and the prosecution of offenders. The Horn can build these capabilities at a fraction of the cost of a frigate and coordinate through instruments such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) maritime strategy, supporting the fleets passing through.[20] Moreover, these waterways are not just a transit route for other nations’ commerce, and include the Horn’s own fisheries, ports, and emerging blue economy. These resources are currently being drained by illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, giving coastal states a durable and self-interested reason to ensure these lanes are open and well-governed. This self-interest offers a stronger basis for cooperation, compared to episodic reactions to distant shocks. Thus, treating the blue economy as a core component of the security conversation will transform the Horn from a passive beneficiary into an active stakeholder in ensuring freedom of navigation.

The challenges to the Horn’s transformation, however, are as much internal as external. Its primary contribution to any multilateral response must be to coordinate through its own institutions, using IGAD and the African Union to pursue a holistic approach that treats the Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz as a single system and factors in the national interests of the littoral states. The institutional machinery required for this has weakened in recent years. A decade ago, a crisis of this scale would have resulted in the urgent convening of an IGAD summit; however, such a summit has failed to materialise. Instead, the region is now being pulled in the opposite direction as a result of intra-regional rivalries over Somali sovereignty, Ethiopia’s search for sea access, and the external alignments courting the coastline.[21]

Strategic alignments are already actively forming. When Saudi Arabia launched a Multinational Maritime Defence Coalition for the Red Sea in July 2026, Djibouti, Somalia, and Sudan joined as founding members alongside Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and the Gulf States. While this represents genuine participation, it takes place within a coalition designed and led by Riyadh, in which the Horn is member rather than an author, operating under a Saudi commander and a Pakistani deputy. To shift this dynamic, the region must act on two tracks simultaneously: individually leveraging their ports, basing options, and partnerships for a genuine seat at the table, while also jointly using the African Union, IGAD, and the Djibouti Code of Conduct framework to carry a collective position into the France-UK-led effort forming to the north.[22]

Conclusion

The Hormuz crisis cannot be governed in isolation from the Bab el-Mandeb. Any truly multilateral response must extend its architecture down the Red Sea corridor and bring the Horn of Africa in as a partner rather than treat it as a passive coastline from which others operate. The Saudi-led coalition shows that such mechanisms are already forming, and the Horn will inevitably be drawn into them. The question is whether it enters on others’ terms or helps write the rules.

The region’s most valuable contributions to that response are not principally naval; they are its geography and ports, its legal standing and frameworks as coastal states, and its capacity for the coastal-state work that secures a waterway. For these recommendations to bear fruit, however, the region must first assume responsibility. The surest way for it to continue having the rules of its own front yard dictated by others is to remain too divided to write them itself. For the Horn to be treated as a partner, it must act as one.


Samira Gaid is Founding Director and Head of Research and Policy, Balqiis Insights.

The author acknowledges the use of Claude (Anthropic), Opus 4.8, to assist with background source research and with the identification and formatting of references, and to support the structuring and editing of drafts of this article. The author verified all factual and empirical claims and checked every citation against its primary source. The author is solely responsible for the analysis, arguments, and conclusions presented.


[1] Amani Africa, “Informal Consultation: ‘The Impact of the Middle East Crisis on the Peace and Security Situation of Africa,’” April 8, 2026, https://amaniafrica-et.org/informal-consultation-the-impact-of-the-middle-east-crisis-on-the-peace-and-security-situation-of-africa/

[2] United States Energy Information Administration, “Three Important Oil Trade Chokepoints Are Located around the Arabian Peninsula,” Today in Energy, August 4, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32352

[3] Samriddhi Vij, “Double Chokepoint: Impact of a Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb Closure,” Observer Research Foundation Middle East, April 23, 2026, https://orfme.org/expert-speak/double-chokepoint-impact-of-a-hormuz-and-bab-al-mandeb-closure/; Yonas Yizezew, “Could Bab el-Mandeb Become the Next Strait of Hormuz?,” Horn Review, June 8, 2026, https://hornreview.org/2026/06/08/could-bab-el-mandeb-become-the-next-strait-of-hormuz/

[4] United States Energy Information Administration, “Fewer Tankers Transit the Red Sea in 2024,” Today in Energy, 2024, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=63446; United States Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints

[5] “UN Agencies Warn of Worsening Hunger and Malnutrition Crisis in Somalia as Famine Risk Emerges,” United Nations Children’s Fund, 2026, https://www.unicef.org/somalia/press-releases/un-agencies-warn-worsening-hunger

[6] “Somalia Teeters on the Brink of Catastrophe as Hunger Crisis Deepens,” UN News, May 2026, https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/05/1167473

[7] World Bank, “Fertilizer Prices Surge as Strait of Hormuz Disruptions Tighten Supplies,” Data Blog, 2026, https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/opendata/fertilizer-prices-surge-as-strait-of-hormuz-disruptions-tighten-; World Food Programme, “Somalia’s Humanitarian Crisis Worsening, with 6.5 Million People Facing High Levels of Hunger,” 2026, https://www.wfp.org/news/somalias-humanitarian-crisis-worsening-65-million-people-facing-high-levels-hunger-federal; Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), Somalia, https://fews.net/east-africa/somalia

[8] World Bank, “Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP), Somalia,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=SO

[9] William Wallis and Susannah Savage, “Meat Cargoes Bound for Gulf Stranded as Conflict Hits Eid Trade,” Financial Times, March 20, 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/20f7a188-5cd1-48f6-a01a-6bca7c61131d?syn-25a6b1a6=1

[10] “The Hormuz Entanglement: Why Ethiopia’s Fuel Crisis Is a Perfect Storm of War, Graft, and Reform,” Addis Standard, 2026, https://addisstandard.com/the-hormuz-entanglement-why-ethiopias-fuel-crisis-is-a-perfect-storm-of-war-graft-and-reform/; “Gov’t Raises Fuel Prices by 16.6% as Subsidy Burden Reaches 272 Billion Birr,” Capital (Ethiopia), April 2, 2026, https://capitalethiopia.com/2026/04/02/govt-raises-fuel-prices-by-16-6-as-subsidy-burden-reaches-272-billion-birr/

[11] International Institute for Strategic Studies, Lawless Seas, Contested Shores: Piracy, Smuggling and the Scramble for Port Access in the Horn of Africa, January 2026, https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2026/01/lawless-seas-contested-shores—piracy-smuggling-and-the-scramble-for-port-access-in-the-horn-of-africa/

[12] Faisal Ali, “Israel Becomes First Country to Recognise Somaliland,” Al Jazeera, December 26, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/26/israel-becomes-first-country-to-recognise-somaliland; Ehud Yaari, “Recognizing Somaliland: Israel’s Return to the Red Sea,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 16, 2026, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/recognizing-somaliland-israels-return-red-sea

[13] Paul D. Williams, “Flailing State: The Resurgence of al-Shabaab in Somalia,” War on the Rocks, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/flailing-state-the-resurgence-of-al-shabaab-in-somalia/; Selam Tadesse Demissie, “Disunity in Somalia Is al-Shabaab’s Greatest Weapon,” ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), July 28, 2025, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/disunity-in-somalia-is-al-shabaab-s-greatest-weapon

[14] United Nations, “Security Council Re-Authorizes African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia, Adopting Resolution 2809 (2025),” December 2025, https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16262.doc.htm; Partha Moman, “With AUSSOM’s Funding Challenges Here to Stay, What Are the Options for the Mission’s Future in Somalia?,” Global Observatory, International Peace Institute, January 16, 2026, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2026/01/with-aussoms-funding-challenges-here-to-stay-what-are-the-options-for-the-missions-future-in-somalia/; Emmaculate A Liaga and Tamrat Zeyede Haile, “AU’s Somalia Peace Mission Cannot Deliver on Funding Pledges Alone,” ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies, October 13, 2025, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/au-s-somalia-peace-mission-cannot-deliver-on-funding-pledges-alone

[15] “Egypt, Eritrea Sign Groundbreaking Maritime Cooperation Deal in High-Level Asmara Talks,” Ahram Online, May 16, 2026, https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/1234/568056/Egypt/Foreign-Affairs/Egypt,-Eritrea-sign-groundbreaking-maritime-cooper.aspx; “Egypt, Eritrea Sign Maritime Transport Pact, Declare Red Sea Security Exclusive to Littoral States,” Daily News Egypt, May 16, 2026, https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2026/05/16/egypt-eritrea-sign-maritime-transport-pact-declare-red-sea-security-exclusive-to-littoral-states/; “Egypt, Eritrea Say Red Sea Security Is Exclusive Responsibility of Littoral States,” Daily News Egypt, June 10, 2026, https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2026/06/10/egypt-eritrea-say-red-sea-security-is-exclusive-responsibility-of-littoral-states/

[16] Yaari, “Recognizing Somaliland”; Seble Getachew, “The U.S. Recalibrations, Global Governance, the Middle East Crisis and the Spillover Effect in the Horn of Africa,” Horn Review, March 9, 2026, https://hornreview.org/2026/03/09/the-u-s-recalibrations-global-governance-the-middle-east-crisisand-the-spillover-effect-in-the-horn-of-africa/

[17] Council of the European Union, “Red Sea: Council Extends the Mandate of Operation Aspides to Safeguard Freedom of Navigation,” February 23, 2026, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/02/23/red-sea-council-extends-the-mandate-of-operation-aspides-to-safeguard-freedom-of-navigation/; Faisal Ali, “‘Our Geography Is Our Oil’: Why Djibouti Hosts Many Foreign Military Bases,” Al Jazeera, April 8, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/8/our-geography-is-our-oil-why-djibouti-hosts-many-foreign-military-bases

[18] International Court of Justice, Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment, October 12, 2021, https://www.icj-cij.org/case/161

[19] African Union, 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (Addis Ababa: African Union, 2014); African Union, African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter), 2016; International Maritime Organization, “Djibouti Code of Conduct” and the 2017 Jeddah Amendment, https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/security/pages/dcoc.aspx; “Saudi-Led Maritime Defense Coalition Moves to Activate Multinational Command Structure,” Arab News, August 14, 2026, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2654589/saudi-arabia

[20] Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD Integrated Maritime Safety and Security Strategy (IMSS) 2015–2030 (Djibouti: IGAD, 2015), https://igad.int/about-the-igad-maritime-security-programme/

[21] Matthew Chandler de Waal, “The Future of IGAD amidst Turmoil in the Horn,” African Arguments, March 26, 2024, https://africanarguments.org/2024/03/the-future-of-igad-amidst-turmoil-in-the-horn/; Yirga Abebe Damtie, “From Multilateralism to Minilateralism: Regional Cooperation Trends in the Horn of Africa,” Wilson Center, October 16, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/multilateralism-minilateralism-regional-cooperation-trends-horn-africa; Bruhan Makong, “Horn of Africa at ‘Dangerous Crossroads,’ IGAD Chief Warns as Conflicts Become Interconnected,” allAfrica, April 28, 2026, https://allafrica.com/stories/202604280444.html

[22] Anan Tello, “Can Planned UK-France Hormuz Naval Mission Help Secure Safe Passage for Ships?,” Arab News, May 15, 2026, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2643626/middle-east; “Ethiopia Signs Agreement to Use Somaliland’s Red Sea Port,” Al Jazeera, January 1, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/1/ethiopia-signs-agreement-to-use-somalilands-red-sea-port

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Author

Samira Gaïd

Samira Gaïd

Samira A. Gaid is Founding Director of Balqiis Insights, a non-partisan, independent research and policy institution headquartered in Mogadishu, working on peace, security and human rights across the Horn of Africa. A regional security analyst and former Principal Security Advisor to Somalia's Prime Minister, she writes on security sector reform, cross-border economies and the political...

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