The Dangerous Romanticism of Orchestrating Regime Change in Iran

US President Donald Trump’s decision to conduct tactical strikes against three core Iranian nuclear sites, Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan, has brought Washington into what was predominantly a war between Israel and Iran. Despite the US intelligence apparatus suggesting a lack of evidence that Tehran was galloping towards nuclear weapons, Israeli whispers into Trump’s ears that Iran was indeed close to getting nuclear warheads won the intelligence race.

Iran responded by launching missiles against the largest US military facility in the Middle East, the Al Udeid base in Qatar, bringing a new dimension to the conflict. This is the first time in Qatar’s history that the country has had to respond to military aggression from one of its friendly neighbours. Doha has previously hosted talks on Iran’s nuclear programme and mediated between Hamas, Israel, and the US.

The proverbial strategic ball is now in Iran’s court, and perhaps more specifically, decisions that the country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, may take. While awaiting further retaliation by Iran, the idea of a regime change has been played around with by actors in both Israel and the US alike. Despite his own team saying the US strikes were only to target Iran’s nuclear programme with no intention of orchestrating political change, Trump took to social media to first demand Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” and more recently, asked why there should not be a regime change in the country if its leaders cannot “make Iran great again”.

The narrative of regime change is not new for the US. Contemporary examples such as Afghanistan and Iraq stand out as mostly failed endeavours costing the American exchequer trillions of dollars.

The geopolitics of romanticising regime change 

The narrative of regime change is not new for the US. Contemporary examples such as Afghanistan and Iraq stand out as mostly failed endeavours costing the American exchequer trillions of dollars. In 1953, a coup d’etat backed by the intelligence agencies of the UK and the US took down the elected Iranian government of Mohammed Mosaddegh and replaced him with the pro-Western Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran. The main reason for Western intervention here was what came to be known as the Abadan crisis, in which Mosaddegh took the decision to nationalise the country’s oil assets away from the control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (predecessor of what is today known as BP) and expelled Western refiners from Abadan.

The ouster of Mosaddegh in essence set the movement towards the 1979 Islamic Revolution in which the Shah was ousted, and Ayatollah Khomenei, then living in exile in France, returned to Tehran to take charge and became the spiritual and political Supreme Leader. The underpinnings of the Iranian power elites since then have been rooted in ideology, theology, and geopolitics, in which Israel and the US have been marketed as existential threats and main rivals.

In 2025, regime change in Iran may well be a pipe dream. Not necessarily only due to Iran’s position in the region and beyond, but because such endeavours have been detrimental to US security interests, ranging from Iraq in 2003 to Libya in 2011.

However, in 2025, regime change in Iran may well be a pipe dream. Not necessarily only due to Iran’s position in the region and beyond, but because such endeavours have been detrimental to US security interests, ranging from Iraq in 2003 to Libya in 2011. Both Baghdad and Tripoli remain strangulated by their political inability to recover since Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were removed from power. Iran has been dealt severe blows by Israel, to the point where even the most pessimistic assessments of its military capabilities have been surpassed. Israel demonstrated a near-total domination of Tehran’s airspace.

Domestic and Regional Intricacies  

The Iranian Supreme Leader is not merely a political head of the country, but also a spiritual and religious one. Ayatollah Khamenei, now in his late 80s and in charge since 1989, has deeply rooted the Revolutionary movement in Iran over the past decades. The absence of immediate political alternatives means that any targeting of the top leadership could only lead to an initiation of the Ayatollah’s own succession plans, as has been seen in the way the top military leadership, including those of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), were replaced after being killed in targeted Israeli strikes.

However, it is the religious positioning of the Iranian Revolution and the potential impact of a direct challenge to it that requires further consideration. Much like Israel’s posture of being the land of Jewish identity and security, Iran is looked upon similarly by millions of Shia Muslims living across the world. An overt targeting of the Ayatollah could reverberate across nations and regions (15-17 percent of India’s Muslim population is Shia). This could also upend the delicate balancing of sectarian divides, which are today suppressed but persist in the Middle East, to come out more viscerally once again and spill into neighbouring Arab states.

The absence of immediate political alternatives means that any targeting of the top leadership could only lead to an initiation of the Ayatollah’s own succession plans, as has been seen in the way the top military leadership, including those of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), were replaced after being killed in targeted Israeli strikes.

Beyond the sectarian spillovers, even moderates within Iranian society who, despite the odds, brought into power Masoud Pezeshkian—the only moderate candidate in the country’s 2024 elections—may predominantly rally around Iranian nationalist fervour rather than opposing the regime. Israel’s military campaign in Gaza and the associated civilian casualties have generated a negative posture against the state across political divides. A prolonged military campaign against Iran could entrench such a public opinion, even though the Iranian diaspora living in the West would support the idea of unseating the current power structures.

In all of this, the centrality of the IRGC itself would be a crucial actor. The IRGC’s wide net of influence across Iranian society, economy, and polity has the Ayatollah’s patronage as its core tenet. IRGC’s impunity in the system is backed by the fact that it operates directly under the Supreme Leader’s tutelage and has strong equities built into this very structure for its survival as an institution. Even in the Ayatollah’s succession plans, pushed into top gear since 2022, the IRGC is widely expected to have a strong say. A space where both these powerful circles in Iran now face a challenge is Israel’s dominance in the air. Consistent degradation of the inventory and personnel of the IRGC will force it to scramble and come up with countermeasures. With next to no air defence remaining, it may look to push the remaining capacities of groups such as Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon into a long-term framework. What is usually degraded does not necessarily mean it has been destroyed. But for now, Iran’s proxies are expected to have limited impact, with Hezbollah recently suggesting it has no plans to attack Israel in way of showcasing support and loyalty towards Iran.

Israel’s military campaign in Gaza and the associated civilian casualties have generated a negative posture against the state across political divides. A prolonged military campaign against Iran could entrench such a public opinion.

Israel’s Upper Hand 

The question of aiding or outrightly orchestrating political change as a strategy will come from Israel and not the US. Washington D.C. may not advise Israel otherwise, but will not become a sponsor for the same unless US military assets in the region are targeted further and casualties take place. Trump, by striking Iran, has already challenged one of his main campaign deliverables: not to enter another foreign war. The Iranian regime may play this card to ensure it is a quagmire ahead for the White House if its survivability is challenged.

The above play brings much of the region under scrutiny. The neighbouring Gulf states, home to some of the world’s largest economic success stories of the recent past, are in uncharted territory as the conflict breaks beyond the guardrails. Israel’s continuous tactical successes against Iran, meanwhile, seem to be motivating the country’s decision makers to skirt international pressure and inflict as much damage as possible—not only against Iranian nuclear and military sites but also IRGC facilities to weaken the regime’s hold. Gnawing away at Iran’s capacity will remain an enticing strategy for Israeli strategists. The recent targeting of the IRGC’s Basij and Alborz forces, units specifically tasked with internal security and protection of the regime’s political stability, supports such a hypothesis. The Evin Prison, known to hold opposition political leaders as prisoners, was also hit in a possible bid to try and free the captives held there.

Finally, despite erratic interventions by Trump, announced via his social media account, the fundamental challenges that bog down Iran and Israel will persist. Israel has taken advantage of an open window to neutralise the Iranian security apparatus, pushing Tehran into survival mode. How Iran navigates this episode will have a direct and long-term impact on the stability of its political architecture, the protection of which remains Tehran’s foremost objective.

Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow with the Strategic Studies programme at the Observer Research Foundation.