Will Bahrain turn the C-SIPA into a multilateral success story?

In September 2023, the United States (US) and Bahrain signed a Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA), entering into force in late October 2023. From the very beginning, the C-SIPA was designed to welcome additional parties into it to become a multilateral agreement, with other Gulf countries viewed as the main contenders. However, perhaps due to the US being the sole international partner and the Gulf countries already sharing a Joint Defence Treaty and a vision for regional security through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), this has not materialised yet.

These hesitations may now be easing, as on 7 December  2024, Bahrain and the US extended an invitation for the United Kingdom (UK) to join their agreement. Bahrain foreshadowed the UK’s induction into the agreement at least two months before the announcement of this decision, with its ambassador to the US describing the UK as a partner that has a “direct stake in and much to contribute to C-SIPA’s success”. If UK’s accession is finalised by March 2025, as per the predictions, it will mark a pivotal moment for Bahrain’s security diplomacy. However, the key question remains: will it succeed in expanding the agreement beyond a ‘minilateral’ framework?

Why is this agreement worthwhile?

The C-SIPA has been described as approaching the ‘water’s edge’ of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Article 5 mutual defence commitments, though it falls short of a treaty, owing to the absence of any legal obligation attached to it. The closest article it has to Article 5 is the agreement’s Article 2, which states that in the event of any external aggression or threat thereof, the Parties shall “immediately meet at the most senior levels to determine additional defence needs and to develop, and implement appropriate defence and deterrent responses as decided upon by the Parties, including in the economic, military, and/or political realms.” Bahrain’s National Security Advisor, H.H. Lieutenant-General Shaikh Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, has described this part of the agreement as being “short of Article Five, but [having] all the guarantees,” adding his hopes this is built upon.

Beyond security, the agreement stands to benefit its signatories through its science collaboration pillar. For example, as a result of the agreement, the US Embassy in Bahrain announced an offering of grants to universities and eligible institutions to enhance research collaboration between the United States and Bahrain. Another outcome of the agreement has been the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency working with Bahraini stakeholders to produce and share hydrographic, aeronautical, and topographic geospatial data, thereby improving navigation in the maritime world and fostering innovation.

Gulf countries may fear the agreement invites external aggression

A recent paper by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) showcased four main security commitments arising from C-SIPA: joint deterrence, integrated defence capabilities, enhanced military interoperability, and an annual Defence Working Group. As a result, one of the Gulf’s main sources of friction, Iran, may view this agreement as destructive to its posture in the region. Iranian state-affiliated media are already shedding negative light on C-SIPA.

By signing on to C-SIPA, Gulf countries may become more committed to providing or facilitating logistical support for the US or UK militaries. However, recent history suggests this could be seen as an escalatory risk. For example, it was reported by the Wall Street Journal last year that the Pentagon was “shifting jet fighters, armed drones and other aircraft” between Gulf countries to organise military action against certain targets, as some had reservations about “riling up” Iran. Many months later, in October 2024, the Gulf states reportedly sought to reassure Iran of their neutrality in its conflict with Israel.

Therefore, Gulf countries are likely to be puzzled about whether the agreement will indeed establish deterrence by approaching a form of guarantee on international security commitments towards the region or instead actually opening up a line of fire they have sought to avoid.

Trump may be a wild card that dissuades further integration into the agreement

In her last call with the Bahraini leadership as the Vice President of the US, Kamala Harris noted that C-SIPA can be a model for further regional integration. Many calls by the Biden administration to Bahrain emphasised the C-SIPA as an accomplishment that can be built on. However, this dynamic may threaten the promise of the agreement to expand, given the credit has gone to the Biden administration, yet a new Trump administration term has dawned—and credit is important in this case. In fact, it remains unclear whether Trump is supportive of C-SIPA to the same extent as Bahrain would hope, especially considering his last call with the King of Bahrain made no explicit reference to it.

Nonetheless, one aspect that may interest Trump is that the opening articles of the C-SIPA refer to the Abraham Accords (2020). By emphasising this link to the Accords which came as a result of his efforts, President Trump may be motivated to push at the very least for the United Arab Emirates to join the C-SIPA as the other founding signatory from the Gulf to the Abraham Accords, with Israel. Moreover, the Trump administration may also consider Morocco as a contender to join the agreement, under the same premise.

Countries like Saudi Arabia may instead favour an agreement that is bilateral and tailored to their needs; even if C-SIPA can be amended to accommodate some of them, it will likely not formulate into the kind of treaty that the Kingdom is reportedly striving for. In 2024, there was a lot of talk that the Saudi government and the Biden administration were in discussions to formalise security commitments from the US to Saudi Arabia. So much so, that the Congressional Research Service has written a report about it, as well. According to the report, this was expected to happen either in exchange for normalisation of relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia’s commitments to forgo certain cooperation with the US strategic competitors, or both.

With this in mind, one worry that may arise is that President Trump preempts and rushes to invite Israel into the C-SIPA. If such an invitation is made before more regional partners join the C-SIPA, or normalise relations with Israel, it may end up dissuading them from C-SIPA completely for the short to medium term. Additionally, a key point to note here is that normalising relations with Israel is a completely different ballgame than entering into a C-SIPA with Israel, which would likely require additional political convergences between the normalising Arab states, and Israel.

Beyond the Gulf: A growing pool of potential partners

Given the challenges to integrate regional countries, there remains a risk that the push for multilateralism stagnates. According to oral evidence submitted to the UK House of Lords International Agreements Committee, the UK’s accession to C-SIPA is an ‘institutionalisation’ of an already established British approach to the Gulf. It may not be enough to garner traction from the other Gulf countries, especially as it has been uncovered to the public domain that Bahrain and the UK already share a Defence Cooperation Agreement from 2012, and perhaps such agreements may be in place with other Gulf countries as well.

Nonetheless, with the UK’s likely accession, countries outside the region may find it attractive. This may also be an outreach strategy by C-SIPA’s current signatories to entice regional players into joining. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are named as potential joiners. Yet, it’s anyone’s guess who could join next.

The biggest contenders may be the parties to the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a multi-national naval partnership based in Bahrain. It comprises countries like Australia, France, Germany, and Italy. In particular, France may be a strong contender: France’s Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier has been deployed to the region and has occasionally docked in Bahrain as part of missions in the Middle East.

Conclusion

Bahrain’s ambitions for C-SIPA to evolve into a broader multilateral agreement are likely enhanced by the UK’s expected accession. However, there remain challenges for other Gulf countries to join it, and their buy-in remains uncertain. First, its value as a deterrence against threats may not seem convincing, nor is it clear how it may be different from undisclosed agreements already in place. Finally, there remains uncertainty whether President Trump believes in the C-SIPA, and if he does, whether his strategy to expand it will prove fruitful.

Mahdi Ghuloom is a Research Associate at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) – Middle East.