Ceasefire Emerges in the US-Israel Conflict with Iran: Experts React

Approximately 40 days into the US-Israel military campaign against Iran, a two-week ceasefire has come into effect — first declared by President Donald Trump and subsequently greenlit by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The ceasefire marks a significant turn following an extreme escalation in the preceding days, during which Trump issued increasingly severe threats: warning that he would destroy power plants and bridges across Iran, and later suggesting that an entire civilization would die.

The conditional ceasefire was mediated by Pakistan’s Prime Minister and its military chief. It followed Iran’s 10-point proposal, which Washington described as “a workable basis on which to negotiate.”

Observer Research Foundation (ORF) Middle East experts offer their concise analysis on the latest developments.

From Ultimatum to Climbdown from Trump’s Corner

Into the second month of the US-Israel military campaign, it became increasingly clear that Iran’s greatest leverage over President Donald Trump lay in the Strait of Hormuz. Trump compounded his own difficulties by escalating his threats — warning of strikes on power plants, bridges, and ultimately suggesting targeting of the entire population, prompting fears of nuclear action across the region. He subsequently found a narrow exit, backing out of a corner he built himself, with Pakistan offering a diplomatic lifeline and, thereby, postponing the deadline on his threats.

With the benefit of hindsight, Washington’s claim that Iran’s 10-point plan offers a viable pathway forward appears puzzling. A closer look at its contents suggests otherwise: provisions such as Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz, the collection of fees from passing vessels, and a requirement for ships to coordinate with Iran’s Armed Forces. It is difficult to see how Washington can accede to Iranian terms that directly contradict the campaign’s original objectives: no attacks on proxies, lifting of sanctions, and potential continuation of uranium enrichment. Taken together, these points would leave Tehran better positioned than before the strikes began, despite the decapitation of its leadership.

What is clear is that Trump had no easy options. Even a conditional ceasefire rings hollow when Gulf states — US allies — continue to come under Iranian fire, and Israel continues its operations in Lebanon.

Clemens Chay is Senior Fellow, Geopolitics, at ORF Middle East.

Cautious Optimism: Why the Ceasefire Won’t Fix Energy Markets

The announcement of a two-week ceasefire produced an immediate positive impact on energy prices, with Brent futures declining to US$94.80 and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) to US $95.75.

The improved outlook reflects expectations of unimpeded passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately 130 million barrels of crude oil, 1.3 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and 46 million barrels of refined fuels are currently stranded on tankers around the Strait. The release of this inventory is expected to provide temporary relief to energy markets, though only for a limited period.

The decline in prices should be interpreted as cautious optimism rather than any lasting shift, for four reasons. First, 11 to 12 million barrels of oil per day have effectively been removed from global markets since disruptions, and offsetting this loss will require considerably more than the two‑week ceasefire period. Second, attacks on energy infrastructure across the Middle East have damaged production and transport capacity, and restoring optimal output will require time. Third, the conflict-induced risk premiums and insurance spikes generated for energy transit logistics will persist until hostilities end more definitively. Fourth, increased stockpiling to hedge against volatility will exert further upward pressure on prices in an already constrained market.

Energy markets are likely to remain volatile until the conflict subsides in a decisive manner. In an environment where comments from decision-makers move markets instantly, price stability is extremely difficult to maintain. The durability of the ceasefire, together with the terms of any eventual cessation of hostilities, will ultimately determine whether the current relief in energy prices holds.

Cauvery Ganapathy is a Fellow, Climate and Energy, at ORF Middle East.

A Ceasefire Hanging by a Thread

What was announced Tuesday night is not a peace deal. It is an armed pause, brokered by Pakistan just an hour before a deadline both sides had reasons to fear. The opening fissures are already visible: Trump says the US “met and exceeded all military objectives”; Iran declared nearly all its war aims achieved. Both cannot be true — which is the opening position of most fragile ceasefires.

What keeps the ceasefire intact is economic, rather than diplomatic. Oil prices fell 13 percent on the announcement alone and S&P futures rose by approximately 2.48 percent. Both economies face severe costs if hostilities continue: for Iran, these costs stem from military destruction; for the United States (US), from rising prices, destabilisation of Asian allies, and domestic political fatigue. The negotiating gap remains vast. Iran’s 10-point plan is openly maximalist — demanding sanctions relief, Hormuz control, US military withdrawal, and an end to attacks on the Axis of Resistance, with no nuclear concession. Washington’s counterproposal demands the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear facilities, limits on ballistic missiles, and an end to proxy support. Trump has already called Iran’s plan both “workable” and “fraudulent“ within hours of each other.

The single greatest threat to the ceasefire is Lebanon. Netanyahu has declared the truce excludes it — directly contradicting Pakistan’s announcement that it covers Lebanon. Iran’s 10-point plan explicitly demands an end to attacks on its Axis of Resistance allies. If Israel strikes Hezbollah, Tehran may respond.

The Islamabad talks on 10 April will determine whether this pause becomes a framework for peace — or simply the final breath before a longer war.

Samriddhi Vij is an Associate Fellow, Geopolitics, at ORF Middle East.

Hormuz: From Crisis Chokepoint to Contested Public Good

Markets reacted swiftly to the ceasefire announcement. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz triggered an immediate decline in oil prices and US treasury yields, reflecting expectations of resumed energy flows and reduced pressure on inflation and interest rates.

Yet the core issue remains: ensuring sustained safe navigation through the Strait. Beyond its role as a critical artery for global energy — particularly LNG exports, which cannot be rerouted like oil — Hormuz is central to fertiliser supply chains and, by extension, food security in developing countries. Free passage through the Strait is, in effect, a global public good. The ceasefire has not resolved the situation; it has merely deferred a resolution.

Gulf states have pursued two complementary tracks in response. The first is diplomatic, grounded in international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This has mobilised Gulf diplomatic machinery across bilateral contacts, multilateral engagement at the UN Security Council, and minilateral initiatives — including a “coalition of the willing” aimed at guaranteeing safe passage through the Strait going forward.

The second track is geo-economic resilience, a structural endeavour: deepening domestic markets, diversifying supply routes through expanded pipeline networks, and building more robust industrial supply chains — effectively reducing the world’s dependence on Hormuz as a single chokepoint.

Over the longer term, renewed regional engagement with Iran appears unavoidable. For now, Tehran has demonstrated both its capacity to disrupt the Strait and evade escalating military assault. Gulf Arab states, for their part, share a fundamental interest in preventing any permanent de facto Iranian control over this chokepoint. Whether that shared interest can be translated into durable arrangements remains the defining question of the post-crisis period.

Akram Zaoui is an Associate Fellow, Geopolitics, at ORF Middle East.

Is the Gulf’s Stake Considered in the Ceasefire?

The ceasefire has been announced with little apparent regard for Gulf Arab states — despite the fact that they have borne the brunt of Iranian retaliation throughout the conflict. While Pakistan, as mediator, appeared to consult Saudi Arabia, any Gulf input seems to have been limited or inconsequential: Gulf interests are conspicuously absent from the ceasefire framework. The threat has not abated — Iranian strikes on Bahrain and alerts across the Gulf in the hours following the announcement make clear that the ceasefire has not brought the region the relief it was promised.

Gulf states must now restock depleted defences against a neighbour that continues to pose an active threat, while their economies struggle to recover amid political uncertainty and no guarantee that the ceasefire will hold.

Oman has welcomed the pause, having engaged directly with Iran in recent days to facilitate passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait appears set for less disruption — but the broader Gulf may yet give voice to its frustrations through a risk so far underestimated: the autonomy to reject any tolling conditions Iran seeks to impose. Some Gulf states may choose to redirect energy exports through alternative, lower-capacity routes rather than submit to restricted and costly Hormuz passage — a scenario with significant consequences for the global economy.

Given these options, President Trump may find that sidelining Gulf interests in the ceasefire’s design entails costs of its own. Disregarding the region’s autonomy and grievances risks friction that could complicate any fragile framework emerging from Islamabad.

Mahdi Ghuloom is a Junior Fellow, Geopolitics, at ORF Middle East.