Beyond Interceptors: Improving Public Warning Systems in the Gulf

Spotlight

• Gulf States’ investments in interceptor systems and air defences must be matched by equally robust civil defence and public warning systems to ensure resilience beyond the battlefield.
• Early and repeated testing of warning systems is critical to avoiding technical failures, confusion, and reduced public awareness during crises.
• Inclusive and effective warning systems require localised and redundant solutions attuned to demographic realities, including multilingual alerts, and sirens broadcast from mosques —to reach all segments of society. 

Governments often prioritise active defence systems to mitigate the consequences of potential war. The Iranian attacks on Gulf States have accelerated efforts to acquire new air-defence systems, including interceptor missiles, interceptor UAVs, point-defence platforms, radar, and surface-to-air missile systems. These investments are necessary, yet the recent conflict demonstrated that military interception alone is insufficient without equally robust civilian warning and preparedness systems. Civil defence measures proved essential in allowing relatively normal daily life to continue during the recent conflict. Nonetheless shortcomings were evident, and opportunities for improvement remain. Policymakers should therefore complement active defense investments with strengthened civil defense preparedness to ensure resilience in future crises.

The Importance of Early Preparations 

Bahrain is an example of a country that led the region in testing public warning systems before February 28, 2026. On January 15, almost a month before the ensuing conflict, Bahrain tested its mobile alert system. As a result of the test and likely detection of technical challenges, officials advised iOS users to update their devices ahead of another test on February 1. Indeed, the focus on mobile alert systems came after outdoor siren testing in 2025 that revealed shortcomings, specifically in the audibility of the sound. Therefore, when the conflict began, Bahrain was prepared not only to activate its sirens, but also to complement them with well-tested mobile alerts. Sirens, however rudimentary, still served their purpose as an early warning mechanism – as demonstrated in Kuwait, which employed differing tones to signal distinct types of danger.

Israel’s experience last year illustrates the risks of insufficient testing: a fatal technical error, which might have been detected earlier, led to two deaths and 21 injuries.

Nonetheless, these tests came relatively close to the zero hour and were prompted by the fact that regional escalation was evident after the 12-day war between Iran and Israel. The infrequency of testing can carry an opportunity cost in terms of public awareness. During the recent conflict in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), for example, authorities had to conduct awareness campaigns to help residents better understand how the warning system functioned. This included recognising the location-based nature of alerts, but also adapting to lessons learned during the conflict – such as adjusting alert volumes in the evenings. In some cases, testing came oddly late, with Saudi Arabia reportedly only beginning to trial its mobile-phone alert system nearly two weeks into the conflict. Israel’s experience last year illustrates the risks of insufficient testing: a fatal technical error, which might have been detected earlier, led to two deaths and 21 injuries. That incident ultimately prompted the rollout of a new alert system within the past year. 

The Risks of Testing

The challenge of pursuing tests is that it can cause alarm and panic, especially if people are unaware of it not being real—the 2018 false missile alarm in Hawaii, though a malfunction rather than a test, is being studied for its psychological impact years after the fact because of how burdensome such alerts can be. Some people in India were recently concerned by a nationwide test of its new SACHET integrated alert system that aims to deliver disaster and emergency related alerts via SMS to mobile phones. For many, it was unclear this was a test. Another challenge is the risk of alert fatigue, where if overly frequent, can lead people to ignore or dismiss future alerts. The ideal solution may rest in conducting location-based tests, with clear and coherent communication about the reasoning behind, and the timing of the test; rather than a nationwide testing effort. The UK, for example, conducts trials and surveys on samples of the population, rather than everyone.

Local Solutions and Regional Standards

Localised efforts also enable localised solutions. What may suit one geographical area may not suit another. For example, Emirati warning messages are primarily issued in Arabic and English. But other languages, such as Urdu, Chinese, Filipino, or Hindi, may also be added depending on the nature of the incident and the affected population. In Israel, alerts were adapted for religious communities during Shabbat, the Jewish Sabbath, with the system modified to include radio-based alerts since phones and televisions are not used at that time. In Abu Dhabi, authorities realized they could leverage the city’s 4,000 mosques to roll out a public broadcast and national warning system. While international best practices provide valuable guidance, warning systems are most effective when tailored to local realities.

The European Electronic Communications Code (Directive 2018/1972) resulted in improving public warning capabilities by requiring states to implement systems that can send alerts directly to people in affected areas via their mobile phones.

Nonetheless, this does not mean letting go of regional integration efforts on public warning systems. The European Electronic Communications Code (Directive 2018/1972) resulted in improving public warning capabilities by requiring states to implement systems that can send alerts directly to people in affected areas via their mobile phones. One could imagine other regional organisations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) implementing similar minimum standards across member states. One of the concerning aspects of the recent conflict in the Gulf was that not all warning systems accounted for vulnerable populations without reliable access to smartphones. Integrated and redundant warning methods can help ensure alerts remain accessible during infrastructure disruptions or for populations without reliable smartphone access. This has been put forward by expert Martin Graf, who argues that mass warning and notification systems “still need sirens”. The Gulf States should consider setting minimum standards that guarantee redundancy and inclusivity, ensuring warning systems reach vulnerable populations as effectively as they serve the broader public.

Conclusion 

Investments in civil defence and public warning systems strengthen national resilience. The recent Iran conflict underscored this reality, but much more effort is needed to ensure civilians understand and respond effectively to alerts, and that systems are tailored to their needs and preferences. Transparency should be enhanced wherever possible: the UAE’s National Emergency Crisis and Disasters Management Authority website, for example, highlights all procedures that the Emirati authorities take depending on the type of emergency. India’s National Disaster Management Authority has a transparent dashboard highlighting the key statistics on the use of its alert systems. Ultimately, the effectiveness of a warning system is measured not only by whether an alert is sent, but by whether civilians are familiar with its purpose. In future conflicts, this may prove just as important as the interception systems designed to neutralise threats. Moving forward, Gulf countries will likely seek to utilize and complement warning systems with a call to action: moving into bomb shelters that are expected to be rapidly constructed. As argued in Raisina Files 2026, lessons from Israel’s shelter system and its contribution to resilience are likely to be particularly valuable.

Mahdi Ghuloom is Junior Fellow, Geopolitics, ORF Middle East.