The Future Trajectory of Power in Iran  

Iran’s leaders invoke the rhetoric of unity and resistance to face Israel, but rising  domestic fatigue and a fractured society limit the power of old mobilising narratives.

As tensions between Iran and Israel escalate through proxy wars, cyberattacks, and strategic assassinations, with the most recent being direct military attacks, much of the focus has been on the regional balance of power. One should look at Iran’s domestic affairs, particularly the recent escalations that risk bringing about serious consequences. In the 1980s, war helped to unify the conflicting political environment in Iran after the 1979 revolution. Today, it unfolds in a vastly different Iran, one shaped by political fatigue, fractured ideology, generational disillusionment, and a society caught between loyalty, silence, and dissent.

The leadership may seek to revive the mobilising frameworks of the past. However, the conditions of the present suggest that external conflict could deepen internal tensions rather than restore cohesion in the long run, particularly following the 12-day Israeli war.

Leadership and Legitimacy

The Islamic Republic of Iran is once again confronting an external threat with internal implications. The leadership’s response to the Israel–Iran conflict echoes the past approaches, particularly during the 1980s, when Ayatollah Khomeini consolidated revolutionary fervour through war and resistance. At that time, the new state leveraged religious ideology, sacrifice, and collective mobilisation to entrench itself.

Today, the state’s rhetorical strategy remains familiar: to frame the conflict as a civilisational struggle, appeal to Islamic and national duty, and call for unity. Many Iranians, especially younger and urban populations, appear disenchanted with the ideological foundations of the state. Religion, once the unifying fabric of the revolutionary project, no longer commands the same loyalty. Meanwhile, nationalism, when invoked by the state, is often seen by critics as reactive or instrumental rather than deeply rooted. The idea of defending the revolution remains potent for some, particularly older generations shaped by the Iran–Iraq War and conservative communities, but fails to inspire the broader population.

Nationalism has long served as the leadership’s ideological adhesive, especially in moments of external tension. During the 1980s, nationalism and religious duty merged to create an atmosphere of collective sacrifice. The war with Iraq was both a battlefield and a narrative device.

In the current geopolitical landscape, amid the ongoing conflict with Israel, the state continues to use this framework in a bid to transform confrontation into cohesion by blending religion and nationalism. This merging of traditional patriotic songs with religious anthems allows the state to deliberately weave a hybrid narrative, intertwining faith with national identity.

For instance, the song “Ey Iran,” originally composed by Mohammad Nouri, has been reinterpreted in contemporary contexts to evoke both patriotic and religious sentiments. During recent commemorations, including Ashura, the song was performed alongside religious rituals, symbolising a deliberate fusion of national pride and spiritual devotion.

Official slogans, rallies, general elections, and military parades continue to be deployed as tools of political messaging, yet their reception remains muted. Participation often serves as a performative obligation rather than an expression of conviction. This gap between the state narrative and public sentiment produces a form of conditional compliance. While the citizens outwardly adhere to expected rituals, the absence of genuine engagement means the resulting unity is shallow and contingent. Rather than signalling broad-based consensus, such participation masks underlying political detachment and latent dissent.

Most of the opposition, along with a sizeable chunk of the populace, view the leadership as an obstacle rather than a source of national unity. During the 12-day war, there were mixed responses. Although some voices supported Israeli strikes, the majority remained silent, resisting external intervention out of patriotism, even as they criticised the current leadership.

The Headline to The Nature of the 12-Day War  

To understand why external conflict fails to rally the Iranian public as it once did, one must look beyond politics to culture and psychology.

The Islamic Republic, like during the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, continues to promote a culture of martyrdom and resistance, but it does so now in an environment where the population is more sceptical than spiritual. The contemporary public environment is marked by a shift in priorities from ideological commitment to practical concerns. Moreover, economic decline, political stagnation, corruption, and global isolation have shifted public priorities from ideology to survival.

Modern warfare further complicates the leadership’s attempt to mobilise national sentiment. The Iran–Israel confrontation is not a full-scale war. It is shadowy and asymmetrical, characterised by cyberattacks, targeted military strikes and assassinations, and proxy engagements. Such tactics are technocratic rather than emotive. They do not summon the kind of visceral loyalty that trench warfare or mass mobilisation once did.

Israel’s operations and rhetorical support for leadership change have failed to resonate with the Iranian public. While the state may publicly present silence as loyalty, it likely also recognises latent discontent and manages it through a combination of surveillance, incentives, and constraints. The silence is more deafening than ever, with neither Israel nor the Islamic Republic able to rally the majority of Iranians to their side.

Indeed, many Iranians are unsure what this war means for them. This breeds apathy, not activism. As a result, the conflict becomes another layer in a broader crisis of legitimacy where a government attempts to invoke a collective memory that no longer resonates with the collective minds.

Khamenei’s Succession Plans

The question of who will succeed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is perhaps the most consequential yet least resolved issue in Iranian politics. The uncertainty surrounding succession is not merely a matter of personal choice but a reflection of structural fractures within the Islamic Republic’s ruling elite. Khamenei, in power since 1989, has crafted a political ecosystem that thrives on balancing competing factions rather than grooming a single, dominant heir. This has left the political field without a universally acceptable candidate.

There is increasing speculation surrounding figures such as Sadeq Larijani, a former chief of the judiciary, Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the Supreme Leader and Hassan Rouhani, the former president. Though the latter’s candidacy risks undermining the republic’s revolutionary, anti-monarchical credentials. Ebrahim Raisi, who served as Iran’s president from 2021 until his death in 2024, was a staunch conservative cleric closely aligned with Ayatollah Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He was known for his hardline judicial record and was considered a leading contender to succeed the Supreme Leader. Without Raisi as a unifying conservative figure, the competition may become a protracted power struggle with the IRGC.

In this climate, the Israel–Iran conflict becomes an additional layer of political calculus. External threats have historically been leveraged to close ranks internally, but today’s elite is less cohesive. Instead of rallying around a wartime successor, power brokers may see the post-Khamenei era as an opportunity to expand their own influence, potentially leading to a contested or transitional leadership model. The absence of a broadly accepted successor is not merely a sign of political uncertainty; it is a warning that Iran’s next leadership transition could be the most fragile since 1989.

Conclusion

The Israel–Iran conflict, far from reviving the Islamic Republic’s wartime unity of the 1980s, has revealed the limits of its mobilising narrative in a society shaped by generational change, economic hardship, and political fatigue. While the leadership continues to draw on the familiar lexicon of resistance, sacrifice, and religious nationalism, these appeals resonate unevenly. It may retain some potency among older, rural, or conservative communities, but receives muted compliance or quiet scepticism from urban and younger demographics.

Iran’s younger, more connected generation values jobs, freedoms, and links with the world over strict ideology. Many are critical of the government, yet they do not call for foreign intervention. Most Iranians, despite their political proclivity, feel strong national pride and reject outside influence. Recent conflicts reveal that while trust in the government is falling, loyalty to the nation remains strong, with many choosing to keep their criticism muted to avoid harming the country during the war. Post-war, however, this silence may break.

Kamyar Kayvanfar is a native Persian and English speaking communications and public affairs professional with experience at EY and Kreab.