Turbulence Ahead

The re-election of Donald Trump in the United States (US) has introduced a wave of turbulence to the international system, reversing certain pre-existing trends while accelerating others. Trump’s second term has been marked by the imposition of high tariffs on numerous trade partners, resulting in disruptions to global commercial flows. He has also overseen the US’s retrenchment from various multilateral organizations and arrangements. The US has simultaneously demonstrated a greater willingness to end major conflicts, such as those in Ukraine and Gaza, while exhibiting reduced restraint in its use of force, whether strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities or operations in Latin America. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine continues to contribute to Europe’s rearmament. Israel’s strikes in Iran, Syria, Qatar, and Yemen reflect broader upheaval spreading across the Middle East and beyond. China’s competition with the US persists, extending across multiple domains and regions. Amid this backdrop, at least five major geopolitical megatrends are likely to unfold.

1. China-Russia Cooperation Intensifies

China and Russia are expected to continue expanding the ‘no limits’ partnership they declared in 2022 through new technological and operational coordination, despite attempts by the Trump administration in the US to engage Beijing and Moscow separately.^[1] Following Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia in 2024, Russian reporting announced the two sides agreed to expand military-technical cooperation and joint military exercises.^[2] In August 2025, the two sides implemented this commitment with their annual joint sea exercise, which involved a wider geographical remit (including a joint patrol in the Western Pacific) and new capabilities (including an enhanced focus on sub-surface and anti-submarine warfare). Additionally, the two sides participated in their first trilateral exercise with Mongolia, which enabled the three parties to experiment with the use of unmanned systems and robotics for territorial enforcement. There is also evidence of Russia training Chinese paratroopers, suggesting an accelerated timeline for some of China’s military modernization goals.^[3]

The broader movement toward China’s accelerated military modernization was on display during its ‘Victory Day’ military parade in September 2025, when a wide variety of emerging military hardware—from unmanned and cyber systems to hypersonic capabilities— was showcased.^[4] Active Chinese preparations for a Taiwan-related amphibious invasion or blockade remain ongoing, as does China’s increased Coast Guard activity, “swarming” tactics, and use of maritime militia to assert presence near disputed maritime features in the South China Sea. Japan’s 2025 Defence White Paper explicitly highlights China’s use of grey-zone tactics via the China Coast Guard (CCG) and its cooperation with military and para military organs.^[5]

China and Russia are expected to continue expanding the ‘no limits’ partnership they declared in 2022 through new technological and operational coordination.

The Sino-Russian partnership is likely to affect the two countries’ closest military partners, such as Pakistan, North Korea, Belarus, and possibly Iran. Pakistan’s launch of an Army Rocket Force Command in August 2025, along with other developments in its defense, acquisitions and doctrine indicates much closer military collaboration with China in the years ahead.^[6] The China-Russia relationship also has important implications for the war in Ukraine, with China’s foreign minister Wang Yi reportedly telling European diplomats in July that Beijing would not accept Russia losing the war in Ukraine and that such an outcome would allow the US to turn its full attention to China.

The Sino-Russian partnership is likely to affect the two countries’ closest military partners, such as Pakistan, North Korea, Belarus, and possibly Iran.

2. Minilateralism and Bilateralism Deepen

The world is expected to witness countries con fronting the twin overdependencies on the US (for market demand) and China (for product supply), as well as weakening multilateralism amid Washington and Beijing’s reluctance to invest in inclusive international systems. This is leading to various countries and regional powers seeking more bilateral and mini lateral solutions and may involve a flurry of individualized trade and supply chain arrangements as well as a thickening of customized security arrangements, as various powers seek to diversify.

Weakening multilateralism underpins this trend. The United Nations system missed another opportunity to reform itself during the 2024 Summit of the Future.^[7] The World Trade Organization’s dispute resolution mechanism remains paralyzed. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has not been unanimous on important challenges in the South China Sea and Myanmar, although it delivered somewhat on the conflict between Thai land and Cambodia.^[8] Other arrangements and entities are partially compensating for this gap. Trade is increasingly shaped through a complex network of bilateral and regional trading arrangements. The European Union (EU) has concluded trade agreements with South American countries (Mercosur); the United Kingdom (UK) and India similarly concluded a long-negotiated agreement.^[9]

The world is expected to witness countries confronting the twin overdependencies on the US (for market demand) and China (for product supply), as well as weakening multilateralism amid Washington and Beijing’s reluctance to invest in inclusive international systems.

Security is often addressed bilaterally (such as the US-Philippines alliance) or minilaterally (such as the Quad).^[10] To less fanfare, the Japan–Philippines–US Trilateral has institutionalized joint patrols and maritime domain awareness cooperation in the West Philippine Sea, while the Japan-South Korea-US frame work has developed into an annual security dialogue on missile defence and data-sharing.^[11] Changes to defence spending and posture in several countries, including in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East create new opportunities for bilateral and minilateral defence industrial cooperation. More interaction be tween various theaters, such as between Europe and the Indo-Pacific, can be anticipated. For example, Japan, Italy, and the UK have collaborated on a new Global Combat Aircraft Programme.^[12]

3. Western Hemispheric Tensions Rise

Latin America is experiencing heightened tensions. A region that had largely resolved inter-state conflict and remained insulated from great-power competition is now witnessing a return to peacetime competition for influence and possible conflict, against a con text of political polarization and competition over commodities. The US has shifted towards a greater focus on Western Hemispheric affairs, including homeland defense, border enforcement, and count er- drug operations. The Trump administration ap pears to have adopted a more expansive view of what homeland security entails, expanding it to include the use of the military for domestic law enforcement sup port, and military strikes on alleged drug traffickers in the Caribbean; as shown by Washington’s actions in Venezuela at the beginning of the year.

The positioning of a US aircraft carrier battle group and other capabilities in the Caribbean in 2025 is likely to signal future developments.^[13] Venezuela continues to face economic hardship, despite latent oil riches, and has made more assertive territorial claims over neighboring Guyana.^[14] How the country’s eco nomic situation evolves in a post-Nicolás Maduro era remains to be seen. Leaderships in Argentina and El Salvador have aligned their political trajectories with Trump-era policies, while others such as Brazil and Peru are pursuing greater economic cooperation with China in the form of trade and investment. The global race for critical minerals is set to engage Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru, while China continues to seek security opportunities in the region, whether in the form of arms sales, ground stations, or port and maritime infrastructure opportunities.^[15]

The global race for critical minerals is set to engage Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru.

4. Competition Intensifies in New Domains and Regions

Official statements and agreements by governments around the world underscore the growing importance of undersea capabilities, Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled operations, and supply-chain security as key elements of national competitiveness. There is a broad recognition that strategic rivalries will increasingly be contested below the water line, in the digital sphere, and in space. Furthermore, the line between civilian industry and defense is expected to blur further, including in these domains, requiring stricter export controls, national or region-wide industrial policies, and clarity on national security laws. Matching doctrines with capabilities is likely to prove challenging: some countries may seek to impose preemptive constraints on competition, while others are likely to allow regulation to follow capabilities.

These developments are expected to influence the AI Impact Summit hosted in 2026 in India.^[16] They will also shape the future of high technology security partnerships such as AUKUS, which involves nuclear submarine and high technology sharing between the US, Australia, and the UK.^[17] Autonomous underwater capabilities are under development, supported by quantum navigation, while Israel has demonstrated emerging advantages in precision strike capabilities enabled by space and artificial intelligence that many traditional missile and air defense systems struggle to counter effectively. Existing multilateral regimes that govern weapons sales —such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Wassenaar Arrangement— risk irrelevance if they fail to keep pace with new technologies. Meanwhile, geopolitical competition is extending into new regions. The Gulf of Guinea, for example, has witnessed multiple glob al powers (including China, India, and the European Union) employing military force, often motivated by counter-piracy objectives.^[18] Moreover, the Arctic is gaining strategic importance through the potential extraction of natural resources and the increased use of the Northern Sea Route.^[19]

There is a broad recognition that strategic rivalries will increasingly be contested below the water line, in the digital sphere, and in space.

5. Nuclear Competition Returns

Multiple developments indicate the ongoing erosion of existing global arms-control regimes and the potential for a new era of nuclear modernization and, possibly, nuclear expansion. Every power in possession of nuclear weapons is engaged in intensive modernization programmes, potentially ending what had been a trend toward reduction in nuclear stocks.^[20]

Multiple developments indicate the ongoing erosion of existing global arms-control regimes and the potential for a new era of nuclear modernization and, possibly, nuclear expansion.

China, in particular, is driving a rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal, as well as associated delivery systems, prompting the US to rethink its nuclear strategy: the new nuclear arms race is consequently reshaping conventional military force postures. Furthermore, several non-nuclear weapon powers are investing in associated civilian nuclear technologies or delivery mechanisms, possibly as a precursor to nuclear weaponization. Saudi Arabia, for example, signed a new defense pact with Pakistan that includes an extended deterrence commitment, while recent polling suggests that public support for indigenous nuclear capabilities has reached all-time highs in South Korea.^[21]

Several non-nuclear weapon powers are investing in associated civilian nuclear technologies or delivery mechanisms, possibly as a precursor to nuclear weaponization.

Conclusion

The trends outlined in this article are not the only major dynamics shaping global affairs. A resolution to the war in Ukraine remains elusive and will hinge on a host of factors including Europe’s capacity to backfill US military supplies, Ukrainian politics, and Russia’s appetite for a ceasefire. Conflicts in Africa continue to be overlooked, whether in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Sudan, or transnational violence in the Sahel. The Middle East is experiencing countervailing dynamics—the role of Türkiye and Qatar in Gaza; Iranian attempts to reclaim leverage; and the consequences of the Saudi-Pakistani defense pact—that could shape the region’s geopolitics. The South China Sea could become as much of a flashpoint as the Taiwan Strait, while the South Pacific and Caucasus remain arenas of continued competition among multiple powers. Nonetheless, the Russia-China axis, the continued growth of bilateral and minilateral arrangements, a more turbulent Latin America, competition in new techno logical domains and regions, and the reemergence of nuclear weapons are likely to constitute major trends to monitor in 2026.

Endnotes

^[1] “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development,” President of Russia, 4 February 2022.

^[2] “Russia, China to continue strengthening military ties — joint statement,” TASS, 16 May 2025.

^[3] Oleksandr V Danylyuk and Jack Watling, How Russia is Helping China Prepare to Seize Taiwan, RUSI, 26 September 2025.

^[4] Atul Kumar and Rahul Rawat, “China’s Military Parade 2025: Enhanced Capabilities, Strategic Intent,” Observer Research Foundation, Special Report, 23 September 2025.

^[5] “Defense of Japan 2025 (White Paper),” Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2025.

^[6] Sohini Mandal, “Pakistan Establishes Rocket Force, Unveils New Missile,” Janes, 19 August 2025.

^[7] “Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations,” United Nations, September 2024.

^[8] “Chairman’s Statement of the 46th ASEAN Summit Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 26 MAY 2025”, ASEAN.; “Joint Communiqué of the 58th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 2025”, ASEAN.

^[9] “EU and Mercosur reach political agreement on groundbreaking partnership,” European Commission, 5 December 2024.; “Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and India,” Department of Business and Trade, United Kingdom, 24 July 2025.

^[10] US Department of State, “2025 Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Fact Sheet”, July 1, 2025.

^[11] “United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Partnership Advances Economic Prosperity,” U.S. Department of State, 30 October 2025.

^[12] “Global Combat Air Programme Joint Statement,” UK Ministry of Defence, 7 July 2025.

^[13] Konstantin Toropin, “US is sending an aircraft carrier to Latin America in major escalation of military firepower,” Reuters, 24 October 2025.

^[14] “Incursion by Venezuela into Guyana’s Territorial Waters,” CARICOM, 1 March 2025.

^[15] Eduardo Baptista, Marco Aquino and Lucinda Elliott “Starting Latin America trip, Xi Jinping opens huge port in Peru funded by China,” Reuters, 14 November 2024.

^[16] “India Accelerates AI Self-Reliance,” Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, 10 October 2025.

^[17] “Statement on Australia-UK Ministerial Consultations (AUKMIN) July 2025”, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Australia, 25 July 2025.

^[18] “EU and India to Carry Out Joint Naval Exercise in Indian Ocean to Reinforce Maritime Security Cooperation,” European External Action Service, 29 May, 2025.; “China Reaffirms commitment to enhancing stability, security in Gulf of Guinea,” Ministry of National Defense, People’s Republic of China, 4 December 2024.

^[19] “Report on a European Parliament Recommendation to the Council, the Commission, and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representation of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s Diplomatic Strategy and
Geopolitical Cooperation in the Arctic,” Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament, 12 November 2025.

^[20] “Nuclear risks grow as new arms race looms,” SIPRI, 16 June 2025.

^[21] Maha el Dahan and Saeed Shah, “Saudi Arabia, nuclear-armed Pakistan sign mutual defence pact,” Reuters, 18 September 2025./; Peter K Lee and Kang Chungku, “Worth the Squeeze: A Conditions-based Analysis of South Korean Public Support for Nuclear Deterrence,” Asan Institute, 28 May 2025.