New Arenas of Great-Power Competition

The following excerpt is from Chapter 1 — New Arenas of Great-Power Competition of ORF Global Quarterly: Disruption and Recalibration.

In 2026, the scope and intensity of strategic competition show no signs of slowing and indeed, the stakes are intensifying and the rivalries becoming more pronounced. The Arctic region, once a geopolitical afterthought for many policymakers, has now moved decisively to the centre of global decision-making, emerging as a primary theatre of great-power competition. Domain-specific competition on the ocean floor and beyond the Earth’s atmosphere is also moving to the forefront of conversations. Undersea cables carry most global internet traffic and financial data, and space technology has become a cornerstone of both military and commercial policymaking. How major powers navigate this moment, and whether multilateral institutions created in a different era can adapt to the new one, will be the defining questions in the years ahead.

The Arctic Grows in Importance

Since the beginning of his second administration, United States (US) President Donald Trump had expressed interest in acquiring Greenland, a sovereign territory of Denmark, and an island that the US “needs” for national security reasons.^[1] Whatever one might make of that ambition, the desire itself signifies more than intra-NATO pressure; it reflects an understanding that as climate change accelerates, the race for critical minerals intensifies, and melting ice caps potentially open new sea lanes while extending the usability of existing ones. The Arctic therefore is rapidly becoming a central arena of great-power competition.

The drivers of intensifying Arctic competition are diverse and interconnected. According to a study by the US Geological Survey—the most comprehensive one to date—the region is estimated to hold up to 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its undiscovered natural gas.^[2] Greenland alone contains approximately 25 of the more than 30 raw materials classified by the European Union (EU) as “critical”, all of which are essential to defence electronics, the green transition, and advanced manufacturing.^[3] Although these minerals are extremely difficult and expensive to extract, given their location beneath deep sheets of ice, it is unsurprising that the US has shown interest in exploration: today, China controls roughly 60 percent of global rare-earth production and 90 percent of global rare-earth processing capacity.^[4] This concentration of supply chain leverage remains a source of strategic concern for Washington.

Meanwhile, in the shipping sector, the distance from Northern Europe to China via the Northern Sea Route is approximately 40-percent shorter and 10-15 days faster than through the Suez Canal.^[5] Projections suggest that the Arctic Ocean could experience its first ice-free day in 2034 (a decade earlier than previously anticipated), and ice-free summers by mid-century, thereby opening a Transpolar Sea Route that would connect the Atlantic and Pacific for the first time in history.^[6] Russia has ensured it is well positioned for that moment: it maintains an operational fleet of 45 ice breakers in the arctic region, including eight nuclear-powered vessels (by comparison, the US has only three, one of which is 50 years old) and has rebuilt Arctic military installations at a pace unseen since the Soviet era.^[7] China, according to some analysts, has invested nearly US$90 billion in the Arctic, despite having no territorial claims in the region.^[8] To the chagrin of the US, it has also actively sought port and airport infrastructure in Greenland.

Finally, the Nordic countries—Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland—are strategically vital actors in shaping the future of the Arctic. Norway, as an Arctic littoral state and member of the Arctic Council, oversees substantial offshore energy production in the region and has a direct interest in the governance of Arctic resources and sea lanes. Sweden and Finland, which joined NATO in 2022 and 2023, respectively, strengthened the alliance’s Arctic and Baltic flanks and enhanced regional military coherence. Denmark currently carries considerable geopolitical weight due to its administrative relationship with Greenland. Ultimately, the Nordics bring deep Arctic expertise along with critical basing and logistics infrastructure to NATO’s northern posture and will be key to shaping the Arctic’s evolving global role.

Taken together, the combination of resources, shipping routes, and military positioning makes it clear that the Arctic region will be at the forefront of policymaking conversations in the coming years.

Strategic Considerations: Below the Waterline and in Space

Meanwhile, two specific domains demand particular attention: the proliferation and strategic importance of undersea cables, and the race to develop space-based capabilities.

Undersea cables carry over 95 percent of global data traffic and underpin the global financial systems, military communications, and intelligence architectures on which nations depend for technological and economic survival.^[9] Yet these cables are also critically vulnerable: they predominantly lie on the open seabed and traverse thousands of miles of unmonitored ocean floor. Incidents such as dragged anchors or deliberate line cuts are difficult to detect in real-time and may take weeks to repair. Globally, there are only 62 specialised cable-laying repair vessels (heavily concentrated among a small number of mostly European companies, but with China building its own fleet and capacity) which are both ageing and insufficient to match the pace of cable expansion, leaving a weakness that can be actively exploited.^[10]

In December 2024, the Estlink 2 power cable between Finland and Estonia was severed alongside two telecommunications cables.^[11] The alleged culprit was the Eagle S, an oil tanker believed to be part of Russia’s sanctionsevading global shadow fleet.^[12] Similarly, in the preceding month, the BCS East-West Interlink cable between Lithuania and Sweden and the C-Lion1 cable between Finland and Germany were cut, with suspicion directed toward the Chinese cargo vessel Yi Peng 3, which had departed from a Russian port only a few days earlier.^[13]

Undersea cables that carry over 95 percent of global data traffic and underpin the global financial systems, military communications, and intelligence architectures are critically vulnerable.

Both states and multilateral institutions are working hard to address these threats, but there are limitations to what specific bodies can accomplish. For example, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a United Nations agency, partnered with the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) to establish the International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience.^[14] Unfortunately, the body is strictly advisory with no enforcement powers, it explicitly does not attribute the source of cable disruptions, and it focuses almost exclusively on accidental damage. As a result, its practical contribution to protecting against or preventing cable sabotage remains limited.

Other organisations, in contrast, have been more effective. In January 2025, for example, NATO launched its Baltic Sentry mission, deploying frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, and naval drones across the Baltic maritime area to strengthen surveillance and deterrence. The EU has also taken important steps, allocating an additional EUR 540 million between 2025 and 2027 to strengthen digital infrastructure, including undersea network security.^[15] At the national level, states are beginning to legislate this domain more assertively. For example, in April 2025, Estonia granted its defence forces explicit legal authority to act against vessels threatening critical underwater infrastructure.^[16] The primary challenge, however, lies in international maritime law. Without consent, states cannot board or interdict vessels in the high seas, allowing adversaries to anchor just beyond territorial waters to avoid seizure. Closing that legal gap will be a key consideration moving forward.

Beyond Earth’s atmosphere, geostrategic competition is intensifying rapidly. Today, satellites orbiting Earth underpin nearly every dimension of modern military and economic power. GPS-guided munitions, intelligence sharing, financial systems like SWIFT, and early warning networks, all rely on uninterrupted access to space-based infrastructure. Consequently, states are building their space-based assets at a pace comparable to the expansion of their ground-based capabilities.

By July 2025, China had over 1,060 satellites in orbit,^[17] more than 510 of which possess intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Similarly, Beijing conducted 68 space launches in 2024, placing 260 payloads into orbit.^[18] China’s GuoWang constellation, a state-owned low-Earth orbit project that currently has fewer than 200 satellites in orbit, aims to increase that number to 13,000 by the 2030s to provide global internet services.^[19] This initiative will directly rival the US-based Starlink system. SpaceX (which operates the Starlink constellation) recently received FCC approval to expand coverage to as many as 15,000 next-generation satellites.^[20] At present, the disparity between GuoWang and SpaceX is substantial: the latter already has over 10,000 satellites in orbit. Competition between these systems is expected to intensify further through 2026.

Beyond Earth’s atmosphere, geostrategic competition is intensifying rapidly and today, satellites orbiting Earth underpin nearly every dimension of modern military and economic power.

Beyond communication and internet capabilities, the space domain is increasingly subject to militarisation. Russia is developing an anti-satellite system that would “use a nuclear explosion to create weapons effects, most likely an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), that would in turn disable or destroy satellites.”^[21] If realised, this capability could potentially threaten satellites owned and operated by states and private companies worldwide. China, meanwhile, has developed ground-based laser weapons that not only can disrupt satellite sensors, but also pose direct physical threats to them. Additionally, it can deploy so-called ‘dogfighter’ satellites designed to push or pull other satellites out of their operational orbits.^[22] Meanwhile, the US Space Force released a space-warfighting framework in April 2025, explicitly emphasising offensive and defensive measures designed to secure space superiority.^[23]

Competition in these domains will naturally accelerate, but the US will play a major role in shaping its trajectory. The current US administration will likely continue its unpredictable global decision-making, prompting states (especially Russia and China) to hedge by accelerating domestic capability development, and potentially adopting more confrontational approach beyond their borders. Similarly, private companies will continue to influence the evolution of the space industry, with firms such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, and a growing constellation of smaller launch and satellite operators increasingly setting the pace of innovation and deployment.

Implications for the Global South

For India, intensifying competition across the Arctic, undersea cable networks, and space could represent a strategic opening. Resource and shipping dynamics in the Arctic will have cascading effects on global prices, supply chains, and trade routes disproportionately impacting developing economies. As one of the world’s most active space powers, and a notable player in the Indo-Pacific’s undersea cable architecture, New Delhi holds a distinct role in shaping how global norms are created and enforced. It should leverage that position to its advantage. The primary challenge for India will be the pressure exerted by growing USChina competition, and to ensure the rules of the road are written through multilateral forums like the G20 rather than through the lens of bilateral economic and military contests. This will require India to become more comfortable asserting its influence in multilateral settings. In a world of emerging multipolarity, few countries are as well positioned as India to help shape what comes next.

For the Global South, more broadly, the stakes of these emerging competitions remain underappreciated. Countries across Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia are increasingly dependent on undersea cable infrastructure for their digital economies, yet they have limited influence over how that infrastructure is secured or governed. In the same vein, the commercialisation of space will accelerate access to services enabled by space technologies, ranging from expanded broadband connectivity to advanced climate monitoring. This presents opportunities for economic growth, but much of the infrastructure will be owned by foreign commercial companies, leaving countries overly dependent on external actors. As a result, they risk finding themselves on the wrong side of a new digital divide. Moving forward, coalition and capacity building, and a more active presence in multilateral institutions, will be essential to ensure that the Global South emerges as a rule-shaper rather than a ruletaker in the evolving global order.

Rachel Rizzo is Senior Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

^[1] Sarah Smith, “Trump Says the US Needs to ‘Own’ Greenland to Prevent Russia and China from Taking It,” BBC News, January 10, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78vj5n7jg3o.

^[2] U.S. Geological Survey, “Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Resources,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, January 20, 2012, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4650.

^[3] Adrienne Murray, “The Story Behind the Scramble for Greenland’s Rare Earths,” BBC News, November 5, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20251104-the-story-behind-the-scramble-for-greenlands-rare-earths.

^[4] Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz, “Developing Rare Earth Processing Hubs: An Analytical Approach,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/developing-rare-earth-processinghubs- analytical-approach.

^[5] “Shipping and Transportation,” The Arctic Review, https://arctic.review/economy/shipping-and-transportation/.

^[6] Alexandra Jahn, Marika M. Holland, and Jennifer E. Kay, “Projections of an Ice-Free Arctic Ocean,” Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, March 5, 2024, https://www.nature.com/articles/s43017-023-00515-9.

^[7] Lori Ann LaRocco, “How Chinese, Russian Arctic Ambitions are Fueling a U.S. Polar Icebreaker Mission,” CNBC, March 28, 2026, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/28/china-russia-arctic-polar-icebreaker-ships.html.

^[8] Anders Edstrøm, Guðbjörg Ríkey Th. Hauksdóttir, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Cutting Through Narratives on Chinese Arctic Investments,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, June 23, 2025, https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/china-arctic-investments.

^[9] Colin Wall and Pierre Morcos, “Invisible and Vital: Undersea Cables and Transatlantic Security,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 11, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/invisible-and-vital-undersea-cables-andtransatlantic- security.

^[10] Aaron Bateman, “To Keep the World’s Data Flowing, Countries Need to Quickly Fix Broken Undersea Cables,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 29, 2025, https://thebulletin.org/2025/07/to-keep-the-worlds-data-flowing-countries-need-toquickly- fix-broken-undersea-cables/.

^[11] Bruce D. Jones, “Seabed Zero: Baltic Sabotage and the Global Risks to Undersea Infrastructure,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 13, 2026, https://thebulletin.org/2026/02/seabed-zero-baltic-sabotage-and-the-global-risks-toundersea- infrastructure/.

^[12] Miranda Bryant, “Finland Accuses Tanker Crew of Sabotage of Undersea Cables with Anchor,” The Guardian, August 11, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/11/finland-accuses-tanker-crew-sabotage-undersea-cablesanchor.

^[13] Bojan Pancevski, “Chinese Ship’s Crew Suspected of Deliberately Dragging Anchor for 100 Miles to Cut Baltic Cables,” The Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/chinese-ship-suspected-of-deliberatelydragging- anchor-for-100-miles-to-cut-baltic-cables-395f65d1.

^[14] International Telecommunication Union (ITU), “Launch of International Advisory Body to Support Resilience of Submarine Telecom Cables,” November 29, 2024, https://www.itu.int/en/mediacentre/Pages/PR-2024-11-29- advisory-body-submarine-cable-resilience.aspx.

^[15] European Commission, “Joint Communication to Strengthen the Security and Resilience of Submarine Cables,” https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/factpages/joint-communication-strengthen-security-and-resilience-submarinecables.

^[16] “Riigikogu to Vote on Navy’s Right to Use Force, Including Against Civilian Vessels,” ERR News, April 8, 2025, https://news.err.ee/1609657169/riigikogu-to-vote-on-navy-s-right-to-use-force-including-against-civilian-vessels.

^[17] Abhinandan Mishra, “China Rapidly Expands Satellite Fleet Amid Strategic Space Dreams,” Sunday Guardian, August 3, 2025, https://sundayguardianlive.com/world/china-rapidly-expands-satellite-fleet-amid-strategic-spacedreams- 136791/.

^[18] National Space Security Agency (NSSA), “Space Threat Fact Sheet,” May 16, 2025, https://nssaspace.org/wp-content/ uploads/2025/05/20250516-S2-Space-Threat-Fact-Sheet-v8-RELEASE.pdf.

^[19] Andrew Jones, “China Is Developing Plans for a 13,000-Satellite Communications Megaconstellation,” SpaceNews, April 21, 2021, https://spacenews.com/china-is-developing-plans-for-a-13000-satellite-communications-megaconstellation/.

^[20] Jeff Foust, “FCC Approves 7,500 Additional Starlink Satellites,” SpaceNews, January 10, 2026, https://spacenews.com/ fcc-approves-7500-additional-starlink-satellites/.

^[21] Victoria Samson, Seth Walton, and Kathleen Brett, “FAQ: What We Know About Russia’s Alleged Nuclear Anti-Satellite Weapon,” Secure World Foundation, https://www.swfound.org/publications-and-reports/faq-what-we-know-aboutrussias- alleged-nuclear-anti-satellite-weapon.

^[22] Simone McCarthy, “China Is Practicing ‘Dogfighting’ with Satellites as It Ramps Up Space Capabilities: US Space Force,” CNN, March 21, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/21/china/china-space-force-dogfighting-satellites-intlhnk.

^[23] United States Space Force, “Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners,” April 10, 2025, https://www.spaceforce.mil/ Portals/2/Documents/SAF_2025/Space_Warfighting_-_A_Framework_for_Planners_BLK2_(final_20250410).pdf.